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Abstract
This paper investigates a joint source-channel secrecy problem for the Shannon cipher broadcast system. We
suppose list secrecy is applied, i.e., a wiretapper is allowed to produce a list of reconstruction sequences and the
secrecy is measured by the minimum distortion over the entire list. For discrete communication cases, we propose a
permutation-based uncoded scheme, which cascades a random permutation with a symbol-by-symbol mapping. Using
this scheme, we derive an inner bound for the admissible region of secret key rate, list rate, wiretapper distortion,
and distortions of legitimate users. For the converse part, we easily obtain an outer bound for the admissible region
from an existing result. Comparing the outer bound with the inner bound shows that the proposed scheme is optimal
under certain conditions. Besides, we extend the proposed scheme to the scalar and vector Gaussian communication
scenarios, and characterize the corresponding performance as well. For these two cases, we also propose another
uncoded scheme, orthogonal-transform-based scheme, which achieves the same performance as the permutation-
based scheme. Interestingly, by introducing the random permutation or the random orthogonal transform into the
traditional uncoded scheme, the proposed uncoded schemes, on one hand, provide a certain level of secrecy, and on
the other hand, do not lose any performance in terms of the distortions for legitimate users.
Index Terms
Uncoded scheme, secrecy, permutation, orthogonal transform, Shannon cipher system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Investigations on joint source-channel coding (JSCC) could trace back to Shannon’s pioneering work [1], where
a geometric method was developed to design a communication system. For the JSCC of transmitting a Gaussian
source over a Gaussian broadcast channel, Goblick observed [2] that when the source and channel bandwidths are
matched (i.e., one channel use per source sample), directly sending a scaled version of the source samples on the
channel (i.e., linear scheme) is in fact optimal; while for this case the separation scheme that cascades source coding
with channel coding indeed suffers a performance loss [3]. For vector Gaussian communication cases, the optimal
linear coding was studied in [4]. In general, the schemes that consist of symbol-by-symbol mappings (not limited to
the linear one) are named uncoded schemes. The optimality of uncoded schemes for the general source-channel pair
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2has been investigated in [3], which showed that the Shannon limit can be achieved by uncoded schemes only when
the source and channel satisfy a certain probabilistic matching condition. To further improve the performance for
mismatched source-channel pairs, the hybrid coding (or hybrid digital-analog coding) has been studied in [5]-[10],
which combines the traditional digital coding and symbol-by-symbol mapping together. As for the converse part of
JSCC problem, Reznic et al. [11] and Tian et al. [12] derived some nontrivial converse results for Gaussian source
broadcast problem. Besides, Yu et al. [9], [10] generalized the achievability and converse results for the Gaussian
communication to the general source-channel case.
On information-theoretic security, the Shannon cipher system (the noisy broadcast version depicted in Fig. 1) was
first investigated in Shannon’s pioneering work [13], where a sender A communicates with a legitimate receiver B
secretly by exploiting a shared secret key. For lossy source communication, wiretapper might only want to decrypt
a lossy version of the source. Schieler et al. [14] studied a distortion-based secrecy measure in the Shannon cipher
system around the assumption that the wiretapper has ability to conduct list decoding with fixed list size, and the
secrecy is measured by the minimum distortion over the entire list. Yu et al. [15] showed that the systems with
this secrecy measure are equivalent to those with secrecy measured by a new quantity lossy-equivocation, which
could be considered as a lossy extension of the traditional equivocation. Hence the list secrecy is closely related
to the traditional equivocation as well. Furthermore, Yu et al. used this secrecy measure to study the problem
of source-channel secrecy for the Shannon cipher system, and showed that for the source-channel pair satisfying
certain conditions, an uncoded scheme could outperform the separate one.
JSCC improves the robustness of communication or the performance of broadcast, while secrecy coding improves
the security of communication by exploiting the secret key and/or the wiretap channel. Therefore, intuitively the
robustness and the security could be obtained simultaneously if we combine JSCC and secrecy coding together.
This joint source-channel secrecy (JSCS) problem has been considered in several works already. Yamamoto in [16]
studied the secure lossy transmission over the noisy wiretap channel with secrecy measured by the wiretapper’s best
reconstruction distortion. However, it is shown in [14] this secrecy measure is cheap and fragile, since only one bit
of secret key suffices to achieve the optimality of secrecy, and meanwhile, only one bit of additional information
for the wiretapper suffices to decrypt this optimal encryption scheme. A different formulation of the problem was
considered in [17], where the authors assumed there is a fixed information leakage to the wiretapper and wish to
minimize the distortion at the legitimate receiver, while at the same time providing a graceful distortion degradation
when there is an SNR (Signal Noise Ratio) mismatch. They showed that, for a positive leakage, this can be achieved
by a hybrid digital-analog coding. This scenario was extended to consider side information at the receiver in [18]
or side information at the sender in [19].
Analog encryption (or analog scrambling) technologies, e.g., sign-change based scheme [20], permutation based
scheme [20] and bandwidth-keeping scheme [21], can be seen as uncoded JSCS schemes as well, although they are
not designed for a specified source-channel pair. Sign-change based scheme improves secrecy by changing the sign
of each sample according to the secret key. But owing to at most one bit secret key used per sample, this scheme
could not provide higher secrecy even with a higher key rate available. The permutation based scheme improves
secrecy by shuffling the positions of samples. Unlike the sign-change based scheme, it supports any arbitrarily high
3key rate. Furthermore, Kang and Liu [23] recently applied the permutation operation in a digital encryption scheme,
and showed that the permutation is another powerful encryption technique (besides the one-time pad) to achieve
the optimality of secrecy.
A. Contributions
In this paper, we consider the joint source-channel secrecy problem of secure source broadcast in the bandwidth-
matched Shannon cipher system (see Fig. 1). The list secrecy [14] is used to measure secrecy, that is, the wiretapper
is allowed to conduct list decoding with fixed list size, and the secrecy is measured by the minimum distortion over
the entire list. We study an achievable region of secret key rate, list rate, wiretapper distortion, and distortions of
all legitimate users and show optimality under certain conditions. Our contributions are as follows:
1) For the discrete source case, we propose a permutation-based uncoded scheme, which cascades a random
permutation with a symbol-by-symbol mapping. Our scheme differs from the permutation based scheme
proposed in [23] in two main aspects: 1) our scheme, coupling a permutation operation with a traditional
uncoded scheme, is designed for the source-channel secrecy problem, however, the scheme in [23] couples
a permutation operation with a digital scheme, and is designed for the source-secrecy coding problem; 2)
in addition to the finite alphabet case, we also extend the scheme to source-channel pairs with countably
infinite alphabets and Gaussian source-channel pairs, which require us to use some more powerful techniques,
including unified typicality, d´tilted information, and geometric analysis. By analyzing the proposed scheme,
we provide an inner bound for the admissible region. For the converse part, we give an outer bound by using
our recent result [15]. Comparing the outer bound with the inner bound shows that the proposed scheme is
optimal under certain conditions.
2) We extend the proposed scheme to scalar and vector bandwidth-matched Gaussian communication scenarios.
For these two cases, we also propose another uncoded scheme, orthogonal-transform-based scheme, which
achieves the same inner bounds as the one achieved by the permutation-based scheme. Interestingly, by
introducing the random permutation or the random orthogonal transform into the traditional uncoded scheme,
the proposed uncoded schemes, no matter for the discrete source case or the Gaussian source-channel case,
on one hand, provide a certain level of secrecy, and on the other hand, do not lose any performance in terms
of the distortions for legitimate users.
Schieler and Cuff [14] studied the list secrecy problem for the noiseless point-to-point1 version of Shannon cipher
system, and showed a digital scheme, in which the secret key is used to choose a source codebook to code the
source sequence, is optimal. For this problem, a separate coding, cascading source coding and one-time pad,
has been proven optimal as well [15]. Yu et al. [15] extended this problem to the noisy channel case, and
showed that the separate strategy (cascading source coding, one-time pad, and channel coding) is suboptimal
in general and a single-letter uncoded scheme could outperform the separate scheme. In this paper we extend
1Here the word noiseless means the wiretap channel is noiseless, and the word point-to-point means there is only one legitimate user in the
system.
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Fig. 1. The Shannon cipher broadcast system.
the problem to noisy broadcast scenarios, and propose two kind of uncoded schemes that adopt two different
encryption strategies—random permutation and random orthogonal-transform (instead of the traditional one-time
pad encryption). We show the proposed uncoded schemes could achieve the optimality under certain cases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II formulates the joint source-channel secrecy problem.
Section III proposes a permutation-based uncoded scheme for the discrete communication, and analyzed the
corresponding performance. Sections IV and V extend the proposed scheme to the scalar and vector Gaussian
communications respectively, and another scheme, orthogonal-transform based scheme, is also proposed in these
two sections. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Problem setup
Consider a bandwidth-matched2 Shannon cipher broadcast system with two legitimate users3 shown in Fig. 1,
where a sender A and two legitimate receivers B1 and B2 share a secret key K that is uniformly distributed over“
2nRK
‰
4 and independent of a source Sn. The sender A observes the discrete memoryless (DM) source sequence
Sn with each element i.i.d. (independent and identically distributed) according to PS , and then transmits it to the
legitimate users B1 and B2 over a DM wiretap broadcast channel PY1Y2Z|X confidentially by utilizing the secret
key and the wiretap channel. Finally, the legitimate users B1 and B2 produce source reconstructions pSn1 and pSn2 ,
respectively.
Definition 1. An pn,RKq block code consists of
1) Encoder: ϕ : Sn ˆ “2nRK‰ ÞÑ Xn;
2Although here we consider a bandwidth-matched communication system, our results in this section are easy to be extended to any bandwidth-
mismatched system since any system with source-channel bandwidth ratio ns
nc
can be converted into a bandwidth-matched system, by considering
ns source symbols and nc channel symbols as a source supersymbol and a channel supersymbol, respectively.
3Although we only consider the system with two legitimate users, our results derived in this paper can be easily extended to the cases with
more legitimate users.
4In this paper, the set t1, ...,mu is sometimes denoted by rms.
52) Decoders: ψi : Yni ˆ
“
2nRK
‰ ÞÑ pSni , i “ 1, 2.
The encoder and decoders can be stochastic.
Another output Zn of the channel is accessed by a wiretapper Eve. Based on Zn, the wiretapper produces a list
LpZnq Ď qSn and the induced distortion is set to the minimum one over the entire list, i.e., minqsnPLpZnq dEpSn, qsnq,
where dE psn, qsnq fi 1n řnt“1 dE pst, qstq is a distortion measure for the wiretapper. For given distortion levels
D0, D1, D2, Nodes A and B1, B2 want to communicate the source within distortions D1, D2 (for B1 and B2
respectively) by exploiting the secret key and the wiretap channel, while ensuring that the wiretapper’s strategy
always suffers distortion above D0 with high probability.
Definition 2. The tuple pRK, RL, D0, D1, D2q is achievable if there exists a sequence of pn,RKq codes such that
@ ą 0,
1) Distortion constraint:
P
”
dBpSn, pSni q ď Di ` ı nÑ8ÝÝÝÑ 1, i “ 1, 2; (1)
where dB psn, psnq fi 1n řnt“1 dB pst, pstq5 is a distortion measure for the legitimate users;
2) Secrecy constraint:
min
Lnpznq:
lim supnÑ8 1n log |Ln|ďRL´
P
”
minqsnPLpZnq dEpSn, qsnq ě D0 ´ ı nÑ8ÝÝÝÑ 1. (2)
Definition 3. The admissible region R fi tAchievable pRK, RL, D0, D1, D2qu.
We assume that the wiretapper knows the pn,RKq code and the distributions PS and PY1Y2Z|X .
B. Henchman problem
The problem above is equivalent to the henchman problem [14], in which wiretapper reconstructs a single sequence
with the help of a rate-limited henchman who can access to the source Sn and the wiretapper’s observation Zn.
As depicted in Fig. 2, the wiretapper receives the best possible nRn bits from the henchman to assist in producing
a reconstruction sequence qSn.
Definition 4. The Rn henchman code (Hcode) of a pn,RKq block code consists of
1) Encoder: ϕH : Sn ˆ Zn ÞÑ
“
2nRn
‰
;
2) Decoder: ψH :
“
2nRn
‰ˆ Zn ÞÑ qSn.
We assume that the wiretapper and henchman are aware of the pn,RKq block code adopted by Nodes A and B,
and they cooperate to design a henchman code based on the pn,RKq block code.
Definition 5. The tuple pRK, RL, D0, D1, D2q is achievable in the henchman problem if there exists a sequence of
pn,RKq codes such that @ ą 0,
5For simplicity, we only consider the legitimate users have the same distortion measure. Note that our results derived in this paper still hold
for the case with different distortion measures.
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Fig. 2. Henchman problem.
1) Distortion constraint: (1);
2) Secrecy constraint:
min
RnHcodes:
lim supnÑ8 RnďRL´
P
”
dEpSn, qSnq ě D0 ´ ı nÑ8ÝÝÝÑ 1. (3)
The equivalence between the list secrecy problem and the henchman problem, shown in the following proposition,
has been proven by Schieler and Cuff [14, Prop. 1].
Proposition 1. [14] The tuple pRK, RL, D0, D1, D2q is achievable in the list reconstruction problem if and only if
it is achievable in the henchman problem.
Furthermore, the list secrecy problem and henchman problem are also equivalent to a lossy-equivocation secrecy
problem; see [15].
In addition to the DM system, we also consider the Shannon cipher system with a Gaussian source S „ N p0, λq
transmitted over a power-constrained Gaussian wiretap broadcast channel
Yi “ X ` Vi, i “ 1, 2, (4)
Z “ X ` V0, (5)
where Vi, i “ 0, 1, 2 are zero-mean additive Gaussian noises with variances Ni, i “ 0, 1, 2, independent of X . For
this case, the constraint on channel input power
P
“
ρ pXnq ď P ` ‰ nÑ8ÝÝÝÑ 1,@ ą 0, (6)
should be added to Definitions 2 and 5, where ρ pxnq “ 1n
řn
i“1 x2i . For the system involving the channel power
constraint, Proposition 1 still holds.
III. DISCRETE COMMUNICATION
A. Permutation based Scheme (Finite Alphabets)
In this section, we propose a secure uncoded scheme by coupling the permutation operation with the traditional
uncoded JSCC scheme. The uncoded scheme for JSCC system (with two receivers) consists of three symbol-by-
7symbol mappings: x psq , ps1py1q, ps2py2q. The induced distortions are Di “ EdBpS, psipYiqq, i “ 1, 2. It is easy to
show that we can benefit from replacing the encoder x psq with a stochastic one PX|S when secrecy is considered
for the system. On the other hand, observe that dBpsn, psni q “ 1n řnt“1 dBpst, psi,tq “ ETsn,psni dBps, psiq, where Tsn,psni
denotes the joint type (empirical distribution) of psn, psni q. That is, the induced distortions only depend on the joint
type of source and reconstruction sequences. Therefore, if we want to improve the secrecy of a scheme and at the
same time retain the induced distortions unchanged, we only need to require the encryption and decryption operations
does not change the joint type of source and reconstruction sequences. That is, for the encryption s1n psn, kq and
the decryption psni pps1ni , kq, we require Ts1n,ps1ni “ Tsn,psni . To that end, here we consider a random permutation as the
encryption operation, and the inverse permutation as the decryption operation. Obviously, the permutation and its
inverse operation do not change the joint type of the source sequence and its reconstructions.
Codebook (Public Key) Generation: Generate a permutation set C “  Ψk, k P “2nRK‰( with each element
uniformly at random and independently selected from the set of permutations of rns (which is denoted as Sn). As
a public key, the codebook C is revealed to the sender and all the receivers (including the wiretapper).
Encoding: Upon observing a source sequence sn and a key k , the encoder first generates
s1n “ Ψk psnq , (7)
and then generates xn according to
śn
t“1 PX|S pxt|s1tq. Here for a permutation sequence Ψk “ σn, Ψk psnq fi
psσ1 , sσ2 , ..., sσnq denotes the permutation operation on sn (more precisely, on the indices of sn) respect to the
permutation sequence Ψk.6
Decoding (for Legitimate Users): For the legitimate user Bi, i “ 1, 2, upon the received sequence yni and the
key k, the decoder first reconstructs s1n as
ps1i,t “ psipyi,tq, t P rns, (8)
by using the symbol-by-symbol mapping psi p¨q, and then produces
psni “ Ψ´1k pps1ni q, (9)
by using the inverse permutation operation Ψ´1k p¨q of Ψk p¨q.
The proposed scheme above cascades a random permutation operation with the traditional uncoded JSCC scheme.
The uncoded JSCC part provide a graceful degradation of the source for legitimate users with different channel
qualities. The random permutation operation part that shifts the sequence in the same type provides a certain level
of secrecy. Next we will analyze the asymptotic performance of the proposed scheme as blocklength n goes to
infinity. At first, we need introduce some basic properties of the random codebook C.
Observe that for any permutation sequence Ψ, the mapping between Ψ p¨q and Ψ´1 p¨q is bijective, hence we
have the following lemma.
6In this paper, the permutation sequence is termed as permutation sequence, and to distinguish from it, the permutation mapping from one
sequence to another sequence is termed as permutation operation. When there is no disambiguation, we call both of them permutation.
8Lemma 1. Suppose Ψ is a permutation sequence uniformly at random selected from Sn, the set of permutations
of rns. Then Ψ´1 is also uniformly distributed on Sn, and moreover for any permutation sequence ψ P Sn, both
Ψ pψq and Ψ´1 pψq also have the uniform distribution on Sn.
Utilizing Lemma 1, we can establish the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Suppose Ψ is a permutation sequence uniformly at random selected from Sn. Then Ψ psnq transforms
an arbitrary sequence sn P Sn into a random sequence that is uniformly distributed on the set of sequences of type
Tsn (the type class of Tsn ). Moreover, for finite S, the set of sequences of type Tsn has cardinality 2npHpTsn q´op1qq,
and hence
P
“
Ψ psnq “ s1n‰ “ 2´npHpTsn q´op1qq1 tTs1n “ Tsnu , s1n P Sn, (10)
where op1q denotes a term tending zero as nÑ8.
Proof:
P
“
Ψ psnq “ s1n‰ “ ÿ
ψPSn:ψpsnq“s1n
P pΨ “ ψq (11)
“
ÿ
ψPSn:ψpsnq“s1n
1
n!
(12)
“
ś
sPS pnTsn psqq!
n!
1 tTs1n “ Tsnu (13)
“ 1 tTsn “ Ts1nu|ts1n P Sn : Ts1n “ Tsnu| , (14)
where (14) follows from |ts1n P Sn : Ts1n “ Tsnu| “ n!ś
sPSpnTsn psqq! . This implies Ψ psnq transforms an arbitrary
sequence sn P Sn into a random sequence uniformly distributed on the set of sequences of type Tsn .
From the type counting lemma [29, Lem. 2.3], we have that for finite S,
pn` 1q´|S| 2nHpTsn q ď ˇˇ s1n P Sn : Ts1n “ Tsn(ˇˇ ď 2nHpTsn q. (15)
Hence |ts1n P Sn : Ts1n “ Tsnu| “ 2npHpTsn q´op1qq. Combining it with (14) gives us
P
“
Ψ psnq “ s1n‰ “ 2´npHpTsn q´op1qq1 tTs1n “ Tsnu . (16)
Lemma 2 shows a nice property of the random permutation operation: The resulting sequence will be uniformly
distributed on the set of sequences of type Tsn for the input sequence sn, if the permutation is randomly and
uniformly chosen from the set of permutations of rns. Utilizing this property, we can characterize the performance
of the proposed scheme, as shown in the following theorem. The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix A.
9Theorem 1 (Permutation based Scheme for Finite Alphabets). For DM communication with finite alphabets
(S, qS,X ,Z,Yi, pSi, i “ 1, 2 are all finite), the permutation based scheme above achieves the region Rpiq Ď R,
where
Rpiq fi
ď
PX|S
$’’’&’’’%
pRK, RL, D0, D1, D2q :
Di ě minpsi EdBpS, psipYiqq, i “ 1, 2,
RL ď min
 
RK `RS|ZpD0q, RSpD0q
(
,///.///- , (17)
with
pS, Y1, Y2, Zq „
ÿ
x
PSPX|SPY1Y2Z|X , (18)
RS pDq “ min
P qS|S :EdEpS, qSqďD IpS;
qSq (19)
denoting the rate-distortion function of S, and
RS|Z pDq “ min
P qS|SZ :EdEpS, qSqďD IpS;
qS|Zq (20)
denoting the conditional rate-distortion function of S given two-sided information Z.
Note that for the Rpiq above, the components pD1, D2q and the components pRK, RL, D0q depend on each other
through PX|S . Observe that for a given PX|S , minpsi EdBpS, psipYiqq, i “ 1, 2 are the minimal distortions that the le-
gitimate users can achieve even for the non-secrecy communication case. On the other hand, min
 
RK `RS|ZpD0q, RSpD0q
(
is larger than RS|ZpD0q, the optimal RL can be achieved by uncoded schemes when there is no key. Hence compared
with traditional uncoded schemes, the proposed scheme, on one hand, improves improve the performance of secrecy
to a certain extent, and on the other hand, does not lose any performance in terms of the distortions of legitimate
users.
The first constraint of Rpiq is consistent with the performance of traditional uncoded schemes. The second
constraint of Rpiq , roughly speaking, follows from the following argument. On one hand, the henchman and
the wiretapper can ignore the signal Zn altogether and use a RSpD0q-rate point-to-point source code to describe
Sn within distortion D0. On the other hand, the proposed scheme forces the wiretapper’s optimal strategy to
be an indirect guessing strategy: First, the wiretapper decrypts the secret key by using RK rate; then upon the
observation Zn, the wiretapper reconstructs the sequence S1n within distortion D0 by using rate RS|ZpD0q (denote
the reconstruction as qS1n); finally, upon the secret key and qS1n, the wiretapper reconstructs the source Sn asqSn “ Ψ´1k pqS1nq. Obviously the distortion between Sn and qSn is the same as that between S1n and qS1n, since the
average distortion only depends the joint type of the sequences. Hence the wiretapper needs rate RK `RS|ZpD0q
to achieve the distortion D0.
Now we consider a special case: sending a binary source over a binary wiretap broadcast channel. For the binary
communication, the source is a Bernoulli source S „ Bern ` 12˘ with the Hamming distortion measure dBps, psq “
dEps, psq fi 0, if s “ ps; 1, otherwise. The binary wiretap broadcast channel is Yi “ X ‘ Vi, i “ 1, 2, Z “ X ‘ V0
with Vi „ Bern ppiq , V0 „ Bern pp0q , 0 ď p0, p1, p2 ď 12 . Set X “ S ‘E with E „ Bernpp1q. Then from Theorem
1, we get the following corollary.
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Corollary 1 (Binary Communication). For the binary communication above, we have Rpiq Ď R, where
Rpiq fi
ď
0ďp1ď 12
$’’’&’’’%
pRK, RL, D0, D1, D2q :
Di ě p1 ‹ pi, i “ 1, 2,
RL ď min
!
RK ` rH2 pp1 ‹ p0q ´H2 pD0qs` , r1´H2 pD0qs`
)
,///.///- ,
with rxs` fi max t0, xu, ‹ denoting the binary convolution, i.e.,
x ‹ y “ p1´ xqy ` xp1´ yq, (21)
and H2 denoting the binary entropy function, i.e.,
H2ppq “ ´p log p´ p1´ pq logp1´ pq. (22)
B. Permutation based Scheme (More General Alphabets)
Theorem 1 can be extended to more general alphabets cases, as shown in the following theorem. The proof of
this theorem is given in Appendix C.
Theorem 2 (Permutation based Scheme for More General Alphabets). Assume S is countable, qS is finite, and
X ,Z,Yi, pSi, i “ 1, 2 are general7. Assume H pSq is finite, and PS satisfies
NPS
ˆ
1
n
˙
“ o
ˆ
n
log n
˙
, (23)
ΦPS
ˆ
1
n
˙
“ o
ˆ
1
log n
˙
, (24)
rNPS ˆ δlog n
˙
“ o
ˆ
n
log2 n
˙
,@0 ă δ ď 1, (25)
where NPS pαq fi |ts : PS psq ě αu| denotes the number of probability values that are not smaller than α,
ΦPS pαq fi
ř
s:PSpsqăα PS psq denotes the sum of probability values that are smaller than α, rNPS pβq fi minα:ΦPS pαqďβ NPS pαq
denotes the minimum number N such that the sum of the probability values except N largest ones is not larger
than β. Then Theorem 1 still holds.
Remark 1. The conditions (23)-(25) is equivalent to as x Ó 0,8
NPS pxq “ o
ˆ
1
x log 1x
˙
, (26)
ΦPS pxq “ o
ˆ
1
log 1x
˙
, (27)
rNPS pxq “ o´x2e δx¯ ,@0 ă δ ď 1. (28)
Remark 2. The conditions (23)-(25) require that the sequence PS psq , s P S should vanish as fast as possible.
Obviously, (23)-(25) hold for any finite S. Besides, for any countably infinite S, it is easy to verify that any
distribution PS such that PS psq “ o ps´αq , s “ 1, 2, ...9 for some α ą 1 satisfies (23)-(25) as well. However, if
7An alphabet is countable means that it is either finite or countably infinite. An alphabet is general means that it is either countable or
uncountable (e.g., continuous).
8This claim holds when we ignore n is an integer in (23)-(25).
9Without loss of generality, any countably infinite S can be converted into t1, 2, 3, ...u by some bijective mapping.
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PS psq converges slower than or as slow as 1s , then
ř
sě1 PS psq does not converge, and hence PS cannot be a
probability distribution. This implies Theorem 2 holds for almost all probability distributions.
Note that for a countably infinite alphabet S, we need the conditions (23)-(25) to guarantee the existence of a
high-probability set (unified typicality set), for each sequence of which, Lemma 2 still holds. This further makes
Theorem 2 hold, just as done for the finite alphabets case.
C. Outer Bound
For the system with a single legitimate user (remove the legitimate user B2 from the system in Fig. 1), the
following outer bound for the admissible region of pRK, RL, D0, D1q has been proven by us recently [15].
Lemma 3. [15] For the DM communication with only one legitimate user,
R Ď Rpoq fi
ď
P pS1|S
$’’’’’’&’’’’’’%
pRK, RL, D0, D1q : C1 ě IpS; pS1q,
D1 ě EdBpS, pS1q,
RL ď min
!
RK ` Γ
´
IpS; pS1q, PY1|X , PZ|X¯`RS| pS1pD0q,
RSpD0q
)
,//////.//////-
,
where C1 denotes the channel capacity for the legitimate user, and
Γ
`
R,PY |X , PZ|X
˘
fi min
QY Z|X :QY |X“PY |X ,
QZ|X“PZ|X
max
QX :IQpX;Y qěR
IQ pX;Y |Zq (29)
with IQ p¨q denoting the mutual information under distribution QXQY Z|X , is a function specified by the wiretap
channel.
The first two constraints of Rpoq follow from the source-channel coding theorem [30], and the last constraint
follows from an indirect decryption strategy for the wiretapper: Roughly speaking, the wiretapper first reconstructspSn1 using rate ΓpIpS; pS1q, PY1|X , PZ|Xq, next decrypts the secret key using rate RK, then upon Y n1 and secret key,
produces the legitimate user’s reconstruction pSn1 , and finally upon pSn1 produces a final reconstruction qSn using rate
RS| pS1pD0q. The details can be seen in [15].
By applying this lemma to the system with two legitimate users (the system considered in this paper), the
following outer bound is immediate.
Theorem 3 (Outer Bound). For the DM communication (with two legitimate users),
R Ď Rpoq fi
ď
P pS1 pS2|S
$’’’&’’’%
pRK, RL, D0, D1, D2q : Ci ě IpS; pSiq,
Di ě EdBpS, pSiq, i “ 1, 2,
RL ď min tR1, R2, RSpD0qu
,///.///- ,
where Ci denotes the channel capacity for the legitimate user i, and
Ri “ RK ` Γ
´
IpS; pSiq, PYi|X , PZ|X¯`RS| pSipD0q, i “ 1, 2. (30)
When specialized to the binary communication, we have the following corollary.
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Corollary 2 (Binary Communication). For binary communication,
R Ď Rpoq fi
$’’’&’’’%
pRK, RL, D0, D1, D2q :
Di ě pi, i “ 1, 2,
RL ď min
!
R1, R2, r1´H2 pD0qs`
)
,///.///- .
where
Ri “ RK ` rH2 pp0q ´H2 ppiqs` ` rH2 pDiq ´H2 pD0qs` , i “ 1, 2. (31)
Comparing Theorem 1 and Corollary 2, we can identify the optimality of the proposed scheme for binary
communication.
Theorem 4 (Optimality of the Proposed Scheme). For the binary communication (with 2 legitimate users), the
proposed uncoded scheme is optimal if p0 ď pi ď Di ď D0 or p0 ě pi “ Di ě D0 holds for i “ 1 or 2.
Remark 3. Theorem 4 implies under conditions that compared with one of legitimate users, the wiretapper has a
better channel and wants to produce a worse reconstruction, or the legitimate user’s distortion is restricted to be the
Shannon limit and meanwhile the wiretapper has a worse channel and wants to produce a better reconstruction, the
proposed uncoded scheme is optimal. It is worth noting that these optimality conditions do not include the practical
scenario in which the wiretapper has a worse channel than the legitimate users and a higher distortion requirement.
But it does not mean our scheme is not optimal for the practical scenario. We believe that for the binary broadcast
communication without secrecy requirement, the proposed uncoded scheme with p1 “ 0 and with no permutation
operation is the unique scheme to achieve the Shannon limits for both the legitimate users. If so, when the secrecy
requirement is involved, the proposed scheme is optimal as well, no matter what the wiretapper’s channel condition
is and what his desired distortion level is. This is because RK rate of secret key could increase RL at most by RK,
and our scheme satisfies this point. Of course, we need a rigorous proof about this claim, but unfortunately, now
we have no idea how to prove it.
We know that when there is no secrecy constraint, the traditional uncoded scheme could outperform the separate
scheme for broadcast communication scenarios. It is not surprising that when secrecy constraint is involved, the
proposed uncoded scheme still could outperform the separate scheme. However, surprisingly, the example given
in [15] shows the proposed uncoded scheme may strictly outperform the separate coding even for the secure
point-to-point communication (with only one legitimate user).
IV. SCALAR GAUSSIAN COMMUNICATION
In this section, we consider a Gaussian source S „ N p0, λq transmitted over a bandwidth-matched10 and power-
constrained Gaussian wiretap broadcast channel (the average input power is constrained by P ). The distortion
measures are set to dB ps, psq “ dE ps, psq “ d ps, psq fi ps´ psq2.
10Although we can also convert a bandwidth-mismatched Gaussian system into a bandwidth-matched system, just as done in Remark 2, our
results in this section cannot be easily extended to the bandwidth-mismatched system since the linear coding used in our schemes is specified
for the bandwidth-matched one.
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For this communication system, we provide two uncoded schemes. The first one is just the scheme proposed in
previous section. Next we will show that the permutation based scheme also works in the Gaussian communication
case. The other one is an orthogonal-transform based scheme, which cascades a random orthogonal transform
(instead of random permutation operation) with a symbol-by-symbol mapping.
A. Permutation based Scheme
It has been shown that linear coding is optimal for the bandwidth-matched Gaussian broadcast communication
when there is no secrecy requirement [2]. Hence we set PX|S and psipyiq, i “ 1, 2 to the linear functions x “
αs, psi “ βiyi, i “ 1, 2 in the proposed scheme for DM communications, where α “ bP 1λ with 0 ď P 1 ď P and
βi “
?
λP 1
P 1`Ni . Then we apply this permutation based scheme to the Gaussian communication. The performance of
this scheme is provided in the following theorem, the proof of which is given in Appendix E.
Theorem 5 (Permutation based Scheme). For the Gaussian communication, the proposed permutation based scheme
achieves the region Rpiq Ď R, where
Rpiq fi
ď
0ďP 1ďP
$’’’&’’’%
pRK, RL, P,D0, D1, D2q :
Di ě λNiP 1`Ni , i “ 1, 2,
RL ď min
!
RK ` 12 log`
´
λN0
D0pP 1`N0q
¯
, 12 log
`
´
λ
D0
¯)
,///.///- , (32)
with log` x fi max t0, log xu.
Remark 4. The Rpiq here is just the one given in Theorem 1 with PX|S and psipyiq, i “ 1, 2 set to x “ αs andpsi “ βiyi, i “ 1, 2, respectively. This is because they are achieved by the same scheme.
Remark 5. The first constraint of Rpiq is consistent with the performance of linear coding [2]. The second constraint
of Rpiq follows from the similar argument to the DM case.
Note that for Rpiq, P 1 is a variable. Moreover, the region of pD1, D2q and the region of pRK, RL, D0q depend on
each other through P 1 which satisfies 0 ď P 1 ď P . This finding is similar to the discrete communication case. Given
pRK, D0q, the minimum of achievable D1 (or D2) and the maximum of achievable RL are both decreasing in P 1,
which implies for the proposed scheme, transmitting the source using a larger power results in smaller distortions
for legitimate users, but also leads to decrypting the source more easily for the wiretapper. The proposed scheme
with P 1 “ P , on one hand, provides a certain level of secrecy, and on the other hand, it achieves the Shannon’s
distortion limits for both legitimate users. The region in Theorem 5 with λ “ 1 and P 1 “ 1 is illustrated in Fig. 3.
Given P 1, pD1, D2q has no effect on the pRK, RL, D0q tradeoff.
B. Orthogonal-Transform based Scheme
The proposed scheme above uses a random permutation operation (which shuffles the sequence within the same
type class) to improve the level of secrecy. It works not only for the discrete communication but also for the
continuous communication, such as the Gaussian communication. In this subsection we propose another secure
uncoded scheme for the Gaussian communication case which is designed from a geometric point of view.
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Fig. 3. The region in Theorem 5 with λ “ 1 and P 1 “ 1.
To give an interpretation for the motivation of our proposed scheme, we consider a special case where the
wiretapper has a noiseless channel. Apply linear coding to the Gaussian communication, then we know that given
the Euclidean norm, the sequence of a Gaussian source uniformly distributed on some sphere, and so are the
sequences of channel input, outputs, and source reconstructions. Assume we generate a set of bijective transforms
(as a codebook), and randomly choose one of them (according to the key) to transform the source sequence before
applying linear coding on it. To keep the power unchanged, these transforms are required to map a sphere into
itself. On the other hand, by using the secret key the legitimate users could transform it back. Hence the induced
distortions of legitimate users do not change as well. Furthermore, without knowing the secret key but with knowing
the norm of the source sequence and the codebook, in the view of the wiretapper, the source sequence is uniformly
distributed over the vectors that are possible to generate the channel output (wiretapper’s observation) through some
key values. To make the wiretapper guess the source as difficultly as possible, these vectors should be “uniformly”
(at equal distance) located on the sphere. This is because if so, the wiretapper has to cover either all these vectors
or the whole sphere to meet the decryption requirement. It can be shown the orthogonal transform is one of such
transforms. Hence it is adopted in our second scheme.
Codebook (Public Key) Generation: Generate random n ˆ n matrices Qk, k P
“
2nRK
‰
independently whose
elements are generated i.i.d. according to N p0, 1q. Then apply Gram-Schmidt orthonormalization process to the
columns of each matrix, hence all the resulting matrices are orthogonal and they constitute a subset of orthogonal
matrices C “  Ψk, k P “2nRK‰(. As a public key, the codebook C is revealed to the sender and all the receivers
(including the wiretapper).
Encoding: Upon observing a source sequence sn and a key k, the encoder generates xn as follows.
xn “ αΨksn, (33)
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where α “
b
P 1
λ with 0 ď P 1 ď P .
Decoding (for Legitimate Users): For legitimate user Bi, i “ 1, 2, upon the received sequence yni and the key k,
the decoder reconstructs the source as follows.
psni “ βiΨTk yni , (34)
where βi “
?
λP 1
P 1`Ni , and Ψ
T
k denotes the transpose of the matrix Ψk.
Next we will analyze the asymptotic performance of this scheme. Similar to the case of permutation based
scheme, we need first introduce some basic properties of the random codebook C.
Lemma 4. [31] Suppose Q is a random n ˆ n matrix with each element independently distributed according to
Gaussian distribution N p0, 1q. Let Q1, Q2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Qn be the columns of Q and let Ψ be the random matrix whose
columns are obtained by applying the Gram-Schmidt orthonormalization procedure to Q1, Q2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Qn. Then both
Ψ and ΨT have the uniform distribution (Haar measure under orthogonal transform) on the set of nˆn orthogonal
matrices F pnq, and moreover for any orthogonal matrix A, both AΨ and ΨA also have the uniform distribution
on F pnq.
Utilizing Lemma 4, we can establish the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Random orthogonal transform xn “ Ψsn with Ψ uniformly distributed on orthogonal matrices set F pnq,
transforms an arbitrary vector sn P Rn into a random vector that is uniformly distributed on the pn´ 1q-sphere
with radius }sn}.
Proof: From Lemma 4, without loss of generality we can assume Ψ is obtained in the manner described
in Lemma 4. Let Ψ1,Ψ2, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,Ψn be the columns of Ψ. From Gram-Schmidt orthonormalization, we know that
Ψ1 “ Q1}Q1} , and for any rotation matrix (or more generally, orthogonal matrix) A, AΨ1 “ AQ1}Q1} “ AQ1}AQ1} . On
the other hand, Q1 is a random vector with each element i.i.d. „ N p0, 1q, and it is easy to verify that for any
rotation matrix A, AQ1 has the same distribution as Q1, i.e., a normally distributed random vector is invariant to
rotation. Therefore, AΨ1 has the same distribution as Ψ1, i.e., Ψ1 is also invariant to rotation. This implies Ψ1 is
uniformly distributed on the unit pn´ 1q-sphere. In addition, observe Ψ p1, 0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , 0qT “ Ψ1. Hence the random
matrix Ψ transforms vector p1, 0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , 0qT to a random vector uniformly distributed on the pn´ 1q-sphere. For
arbitrary vector sn P Rn, we can easily find an orthogonal matrix B with the first column sn}sn} . Hence sn can
be expressed as sn “ }sn}B p1, 0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , 0qT . Then we have Ψsn “ }sn}ΨB p1, 0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , 0qT . From Lemma 4, ΨB
has the same distribution as Ψ. Hence ΨB p1, 0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , 0qT is also uniformly distributed on the unit pn´ 1q-sphere,
which implies Ψsn is uniformly distributed on the pn´ 1q-sphere with radius }sn}.
Lemma 5 implies the resulting vector will be uniformly distributed on the sphere where the input vector is, if
the transform matrix is randomly and uniformly chosen from the set of orthogonal matrices. This is a nice property
of the random orthogonal transform, similar to the property of the random permutation operation. Utilizing the
properties, we can establish the following theorem, the proof of which is given in Appendix F.
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Theorem 6 (Orthogonal-Transform based Scheme). For the Gaussian communication, the inner bound Rpiq given
in Theorem 5 can be achieved by the scheme above as well.
The inner bound Rpiq can be understood from a geometric point of view. The random orthogonal transform in
the proposed scheme guarantees that given Zn, Sn has a uniform distribution on 2nRK small pn´ 2q´spheres with
radius r2 “
b
nλN0
P 1`N0 whose centers are uniformly distributed on the pn´ 1q´sphere with center O (the origin) and
radius r1 “
b
nλP 1
P 1`N0 . However, owing to the uniform conditional distribution of the source given Z
n and the lack
of secret key, the wiretapper needs at least 2nRKp r2?
nD0
qn balls with radius ?nD0 to cover these pn´ 2q´spheres.
On the other hand, under the unconditional case, the source has a uniform distribution on the pn´ 1q´sphere with
center O and radius r0 “
?
nλ. Hence if ignoring Zn, the wiretapper needs at least p r0?
nD0
qn balls with radius
?
nD0 to cover the sphere. This results in the inner bound Rpiq.
It seems somewhat counterintuitive that the permutation based scheme achieves the same performance as the
orthogonal-transform based scheme, as shown by Theorems 5 and 6; it is easy to observe that for low-dimension
cases, e.g., 2-dimension case (see Fig. 4), permutations cannot always transform a source sequence into vectors
“uniformly” (at equal distance) distributed over a sphere, so why does this property hold (with high probability) when
the dimension goes to infinity? Actually, it indeed does. This is because as the dimension increases, such “bad”11
source sequences will occur with vanishing probability. This can be seen from that12 P prSsn P Unδ prSsqq Ñ 1 as
nÑ8 (i.e., besides on the sphere, the source sequence should also with high probability appear the neighborhoods
of the vectors in Unδ prSsq), and moreover, Unδ prSsq consists of a set of “good” source sequences. Hence the “good”
source sequences will occur with high probability as the dimension increases, that is, permutations will transform
an arbitrary source sequence from a high probability set into vectors “uniformly” distributed over a sphere.
C. Comparison with Sign-Change Based Scheme
In previous two subsections, we give an analysis of the asymptotic performance of permutation based scheme or
orthogonal-transform based scheme. However, is it necessary to let the blocklength n go to infinity? What if n is
set to be a finite value? In this subsection, we study the simplest finite blocklength case: n “ 1 (single-letter codes).
For this case, the permutation based scheme is obviously inferior to the asymptotic case, since for 1 dimension
case no permutation exists except for the source sequence itself. Hence in the following, we mainly consider the
orthogonal-transform based scheme.
For n “ 1, the orthogonal-transform based scheme reduces to a sign-change based scheme [20], [15]. Next we
compare the proposed schemes with this sign-change based scheme [20], [15]. Assume RK “ 1, and the secret key
is uniformly distributed on t0, 1u.
Encoding: Upon observing a source sequence s and a key k , the encoder generates x as follows.
x “ αΨks, (35)
11Here a source sequence is said to be “good” if its permutations are “uniformly” distributed over a sphere; otherwise it is “bad”. Obviously,
the permutations of a “good” source sequence are also “good”.
12Here rSs “ ∆ ¨ Round
´
S
∆
¯
and Unδ prSsq is the δ-unified typical set for PrSs; see the proof in E.
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Fig. 4. Illustration of permutations of a source sequence for n “ 2 case.
where α “
b
P 1
λ with 0 ď P 1 ď P , and
Ψk “
$’&’%´1, if k “ 0;1, if k “ 1. (36)
Decoding (for Legitimate Receivers): For legitimate receiver Bi, i “ 1, 2, upon the received sequence yi and the
key k, the decoder reconstructs the source as follows.
psi “ βiΨkyi, (37)
where βi “
?
λP 1
P 1`Ni .
It is easy to verify that pSt,Kt, Xt, Y1,t, Y2,t, Zt, pS1,t, pS2,tq8t“1 are i.i.d. and
fS,Z ps, zq “ fS psq ¨ 1
2
rfV0 pz ´ αsq ` fV0 pz ` αsqs (38)
“ fZ pzq ¨ 1
2
“
fV 10 ps´ β0zq ` fV 10 ps` β0zq
‰
, (39)
where β0 “
?
λP 1
P 1`N0 , fV0 denotes the probability distribution function (pdf) of the wiretapper’s channel noise V0, and
fV 10 denotes the pdf of V
1
0 „ N
´
0, λN0P 1`N0
¯
. Given Z, S can be regarded as a Gaussian mixture with two components
of equal weight and variance. For such single-letter scheme, in [15] we have shown the maximum achievable RL
(or equivalently the minimum rate needed to code S within distortion D0 with two-sided information Z) equals
the conditional rate-distortion function RS|ZpD0q. The performance of the sign-change based scheme is given by
the following theorem.
Theorem 7 (Sign-Change based Scheme). [15] For the Gaussian communication with RK “ 1, the sign-change
based scheme above achieves the region Rpiqsign Ď R, where
Rpiqsign fi
ď
0ďP 1ďP
$’’’&’’’%
pRK, RL, P,D0, D1, D2q :
Di ě λNiP 1`Ni , i “ 1, 2,
RL ď RS|ZpD0q
,///.///- ,
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with RS|Z pD0q denoting the conditional rate-distortion function of S given two-sided information Z, defined in
(20).
Since it is hard (even if possible) to express RS|ZpD0q in closed form, for ease of comparison, we will derive
a closed-form upper bound for RS|ZpD0q. The result is shown in the following lemma, and the proof is given in
Appendix I.
Lemma 6. If pS,Zq follows the distribution (38) or (39), then
RS|ZpD0q ď min
"
R
pUBq
S|Z pD0q,
1
2
log`
ˆ
λ
D0
˙*
, (40)
where
R
pUBq
S|Z pD0q fi
$’&’%
pλ´D0qpP 1`N0q
λP 1 , if
λN0
P 1`N0 ă D0 ď λ;
1` 12 log
´
λN0
D0pP 1`N0q
¯
, if 0 ď D0 ď λN0P 1`N0 .
(41)
Since RS|ZpD0q denotes the minimum rate needed to code S within distortion D0 when Z is available at both
encoder and decoder, we can give an interpretation for the upper bound from the perspective of source coding.
First, by ignoring the side information, we have RS|ZpD0q ď 12 log`
´
λ
D0
¯
, where 12 log
`
´
λ
D0
¯
is the minimum
rate needed to code S without any side information. Second, if λN0P 1`N0 ď D0 ď λ, then consider the following
timesharing coding strategy.13 If we code the secret key K (1 bit per symbol), then using a linear decoder (similar
to those of legitimate users), we can reconstruct the source within distortion λN0P 1`N0 . On the other hand, if we do not
code anything, then it results in rate 0 and distortion λ. By using a timesharing strategy between these two schemes,
we need
pλ´D0qpP 1`N0q
λP 1 rate to reconstruct the source within distortion D0. Finally, if 0 ď D0 ď λN0P 1`N0 , then we
reconstruct the source within distortion λN0P 1`N0 by using rate 1 to code the secret key, and upon the reconstruction,
we further code the residual error within distortion D0 by using rate 12 log
´
λN0
D0pP 1`N0q
¯
.
Combining Theorem 7 and Lemma 6 gives us the following result.
Theorem 8 (Outer Bound of Rpiqsign). For the Gaussian communication with RK “ 1, the region achieved by the
sign-change based scheme satisfies Rpiqsign Ď Rpoqsign, where
Rpoqsign fi
ď
0ďP 1ďP
$’’’&’’’%
pRK, RL, P,D0, D1, D2q :
Di ě λNiP 1`Ni , i “ 1, 2,
RL ď min
!
R
pUBq
S|Z pD0q, 12 log`
´
λ
D0
¯)
,///.///- . (42)
Remark 6. Observe that only 1 bit/symbol of key can be exploited by the sign-change based scheme even when
RK ą 1. Hence for that case, its performance is still that given by Theorem 7 and outer bounded by 42.
From Lemma 6, it can be observed that when RK “ 1, RpUBqS|Z pD0q “ 1 ` 12 log`
´
λN0
D0pP 1`N0q
¯
for 0 ď D0 ď
λN0
P 1`N0 , and R
pUBq
S|Z pD0q ă 1 “ 1 ` 12 log`
´
λN0
D0pP 1`N0q
¯
for λN0P 1`N0 ă D0 ď λ. Hence R
poq
sign Ř Rpiq, where Rpiq
13Note that the argument here is only available for the inequality (40), and does not apply to the secrecy problem considered in this paper.
For the secrecy problem the wiretapper and henchman cannot benefit from adopting a timesharing strategy since the constraint (2) or (3) is to
restrict the excess-distortion probability, instead of the average distortion.
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Fig. 5. Comparison of the achievable RL by the proposed (infinite blocklength) schemes and that by the sign-change based scheme. λ “ 1,
N0 “ 0 (noiseless wiretap channel) and RK “ 1.
given in Theorem 5 denotes the achievable region by the permutation based scheme or orthogonal-transform based
scheme. This implies for the same P 1, the sign-change based scheme is strictly inferior to the proposed schemes
under the condition λN0P 1`N0 ă D0 ď λ. That is, the single-letter version of orthogonal-transform based scheme is
inferior to the corresponding infinite blocklength version. To see it clearer, the RL achieved by the proposed (infinite
blocklength) schemes (given in Theorem 5) and the upper bound of RL achieved by the sign-change based scheme
(given in Theorem 8) are illustrated in Fig. 5.
D. Outer Bound
For the Gaussian communication, the following outer bound has been proven for the system with only one
legitimate user [15].
Lemma 7. [15] For the Gaussian communication with only one legitimate user,
R Ď Rpoq fi
$’’’&’’’%
pRK, RL, P,D0, D1q :
D1 ě λN1P`N1 ,
RL ď min
!
R1,
1
2 log
`
´
λ
D0
¯)
,///.///- , (43)
where
R1 “ RK ` 1
2
log`
ˆ
1` P{N1
1` P{N0
˙
` 1
2
log`
ˆ
D1
D0
˙
. (44)
Using this result, we have the following outer bound for the system with 2 legitimate users (the system considered
in this paper).
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Theorem 9 (Outer Bound). For the Gaussian communication (with 2 legitimate users),
R Ď Rpoq fi
$’’’&’’’%
pRK, RL, P,D0, D1, D2q :
Di ě λNiP`Ni , i “ 1, 2,
RL ď min
!
R1, R2,
1
2 log
`
´
λ
D0
¯)
,///.///- , (45)
where
Ri “ RK ` 1
2
log`
ˆ
1` P{Ni
1` P{N0
˙
` 1
2
log`
ˆ
Di
D0
˙
, i “ 1, 2. (46)
Comparing Theorem 6 and Corollary 9, we can identify the optimality of the proposed schemes for the Gaussian
communication. This result is similar to Theorem 4 for the binary communication.
Theorem 10 (Optimality of the Proposed Schemes). For the Gaussian communication (with 2 legitimate users),
the proposed scheme is optimal if N0 ď Ni, D0 ě Di or N0 ě Ni, D0 ď Di “ λNiP`Ni holds for i “ 1 or 2.
A similar remark to Remark 3 applies to this theorem.
V. VECTOR GAUSSIAN COMMUNICATION
The proposed schemes are easily extended to vector Gaussian communication scenarios. Consider an m-vector
Gaussian source S „ N p0, diag pλ1, λ2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , λmqq14 transmitted over an m-vector Gaussian broadcast channel
Yi “X ` Vi, i “ 1, 2, (47)
where Yi is the channel output vector observed by the i-th legitimate user, and Vi „ N p0, diagpNi,1, Ni,2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Ni,mqq
is an additive Gaussian noise vector. A wiretapper Eve accesses to another channel output Z through a channel
Z “X ` V0, (48)
where V0 „ N p0, diag pN0,1, N0,2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , N0,mqq is an additive Gaussian noise vector as well. The distortion
measures are set to dB ps, psq “ dE ps, psq “ řmj“1psj´psjq2, and the channel cost function is set to ρ pxq “ řmj“1 x2j .
Consider the vectors S,X,Yi,Z, pSi, qSi as super-symbols, then the proposed permutation based scheme can be
applied to the vector Gaussian case directly. The performance of this scheme can be proven by following similar
steps to the proof for the scalar Gaussian case.
Furthermore, we can apply the proposed orthogonal-transform based scheme to each subsource-subchannel pair,
as shown in the following.
Codebook (Public Key) Generation: Generate m¨2nRK random nˆn matrices Qj,k, j P rms , k P
“
2nRK
‰
indepen-
dently whose elements are generated i.i.d. according to N p0, 1q. Then we apply Gram-Schmidt orthonormalization
process on every matrix, hence all the resulting matrices are orthogonal, and constitute a subset of orthogonal
matrices C “  Ψj,k, j P rms , k P “2nRK‰(. As a public key, the codebook C is revealed to the sender and all the
receivers (including the wiretapper).
14In this paper, we use bold font to denote vector or matrix, e.g., pS1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Smq and ps1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , smq are denoted by S and s, respectively.
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Encoding: Upon observing a source sequence sn “ psn1 , sn2 , ¨ ¨ ¨ , snmq and a key k , the encoder generates
xn “ pxn1 , xn2 , ¨ ¨ ¨ , xnmq as follows.
xnj “ αjΨj,ksnj , j P rms , (49)
where αj “
b
Pj
λj
with transmitting power P1, P2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Pm such that 0 ď řmj“1 Pj ď P .
Decoding (for Legitimate Users): For the legitimate user Bi, i “ 1, 2, upon the received sequence yni and the
key k, the decoder reconstructs the source as follows.
psni,j “ βi,jΨTj,kyni,j , j P rms , (50)
where βi,j “
?
λjPj
Pj`Ni .
The achievable regions by the proposed schemes (permutation based scheme and orthogonal-transform based
scheme) are given in the following theorem, the proof of which is given in Appendix J.
Theorem 11 (Performance of the Proposed Schemes). For the vector Gaussian communication, the permutation
based scheme or the orthogonal-transform based scheme above achieves the same region Rpiq Ď R, where
Rpiq fi
ď
P1, P2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Pm ě 0,
0 ď řmj“1 Pj ď P
$’’’&’’’%
pRK, RL, P,D0, D1, D2q :
Di ě řmj“1 λjNi,jPj`Ni,j , i “ 1, 2,
RL ď min
 
RK `RS|ZpD0q, RSpD0q
(
,///.///- ,
with
RSpD0q “
mÿ
j“1
1
2
log`
ˆ
λj
µ
˙
(51)
RS|ZpD0q “
mÿ
j“1
1
2
log`
ˆ
λjN0,j
θ pPj `N0,jq
˙
(52)
and with µ and θ such that
D0 “
mÿ
j“1
min tµ, λju , (53)
D0 “
mÿ
j“1
min
"
θ,
λjN0,j
Pj `N0,j
*
. (54)
Remark 7. Actually, in Theorem 11, RSpD0q denotes the rate-distortion function of the source S, and RS|ZpD0q
denotes the rate-distortion function of the source S with the side information Z available at both the encoder and
decoder, where Zj “
b
Pj
λj
Sj ` V j , j P rms with V „ N p0, diag pN0,1, N0,2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , N0,mqq independent of S.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we studied the joint source-channel secrecy problem for secure source broadcast in the Shannon
cipher system, in which the list secrecy is used to measure the secrecy of communication. We proposed two secure
uncoded schemes: a permutation based scheme for discrete, scalar Gaussian, and vector Gaussian communications,
and an orthogonal-transform based scheme for the latter two communications. In these two uncoded schemes, a
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random permutation or a random orthogonal transform is cascaded with the traditional uncoded JSCC scheme.
The analysis showed that the proposed schemes outperform the sign-change based scheme. Interestingly, by adding
the random permutation operation or the random orthogonal transform into the traditional uncoded scheme, the
proposed uncoded schemes, on one hand, provide a certain level of secrecy, and on the other hand, do not lose any
performance in terms of the distortions for legitimate users.
Although the proposed schemes adopt two different random transforms, permutation operation and orthogonal
transform, they are consistent in two aspects: First, actually the permutation operation is one kind of orthogonal
transform; second, for the Gaussian communication, the orthogonal transform can be also considered as a shift
operation that shifts a sequence to another in the same “type”, if we treat the Euclidean norm of the source
sequence as its “type”15. Furthermore, it is worth noting that different from the common construction of codebook
in information theory (including spherical codes such as the one used in [27]), the codebooks in the proposed
schemes are constructed by generating a sequence of i.i.d. random permutations or random matrices, instead of
a sequence of i.i.d. random samples. In other words, the codebooks used here specify a sequence of bijective
operations or transforms and hence they apply to uncoded schemes; while the common codebooks in information
theory only specify a sequence of samples and hence can only be used in quantization operation (or digital schemes).
Furthermore, such random-permutation or random-matrix based codebook construction can be also found in [22],
[23], [24], [25], [26], where they were used to design digital schemes for communication, secrecy communication,
and antijamming communication problems. But different from those works, in our case they were used to design
uncoded schemes, instead of digital schemes.
It is worth noting that the proofs used in this paper follow basic outline of the proofs in [14]. But different
from [14], besides the finite alphabet case, we also considered the countably infinite alphabet and continuous
(Gaussian) alphabet cases. Hence some powerful techniques, including unified typicality, d´tilted information,
geometric analysis, and discretization, are used in our proofs. Furthermore, the unified typicality used in our proofs
is different from the existing one defined in [34]. The unified typical set defined by us has a good property that the
sequences in it only have (nearly) sub-exponential number of types. This property coincides with the finite alphabet
case, and is of crucial importance to our proofs. We believe our definition of unified typicality could be used to
further extend the method of types to countably infinite alphabet cases (besides the extension in [34]).
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Denote
Z 1n fi Ψ´1K pZnq , (55)
X 1n fi Ψ´1K pXnq , (56)
Y 1ni fi Ψ
´1
K pY ni q . (57)
15This kind of type can be called “weak type”, since the relationship of it and the weak typicality is similar to that of the traditional type
(empirical distribution) and strong typicality.
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Then from the fact that the permutation operation is bijective, we have that
PCSnKS1nXnY ni ZnX1nY 1ni Z1n pS1ni pSni
“ PKPCPSnPS1n|SnΨKPXn|S1nPY ni Zn|XnP pS1ni |Y ni ΨKP pSni | pS1ni PX1n|XnΨKPY 1ni |Y ni ΨKPZ1n|ZnΨK (58)
“ PKPCPSnPS1n|SnΨKPX1n|S1nΨKPY 1ni Z1n|X1nΨKP pS1ni |Y 1ni ΨKP pSni |Y 1ni ΨKPXn|X1nΨKPY ni |Y 1ni ΨKPZn|Z1nΨK (59)
“ PKPCPSnPX1n|SnPY 1ni Z1n|X1nP pSni |Y 1ni PS1n|SnΨKP pS1ni |Y 1ni ΨKPXn|X1nΨKPY ni |Y 1ni ΨKPZn|Z1nΨK , (60)
and similarly, PCSnKS1nXnY ni ZnX1nY 1ni Z1n pS1ni pSni can be also expressed as
PCSnKS1nXnY ni ZnX1nY 1ni Z1n pS1ni pSni
“ PKPCPS1nPXn|S1nPY ni Zn|XnP pS1ni |Y ni PSn|S1nΨKP pSni | pS1ni PX1n|XnΨKPY 1ni |Y ni ΨKPZ1n|ZnΨK . (61)
Hence pΨK , Znq Ñ Z 1n Ñ Sn forms a Markov chain. Furthermore, since the permutation operation does not change
the joint distribution of the sequences, we have PSnPX1n|SnPY 1ni Z1n|X1nP pSni |Y 1ni “ PS1nPXn|S1nPY ni Zn|XnP pS1ni |Y ni “ś
PSPX|SPYiZ|XP pSi|Yi , where P pSi|Yi pps|yq fi 1 tps “ psi pyqu denotes the conditional distribution induced by the
decoder i, and PSPX|SPYiZ|XP pSi|Yi is the distribution given in (18).
Since
´
Sn, pSni ¯ is an i.i.d. sequence, by the law of large numbers,
P
”
dBpSn, pSni q ď EdBpS, pSiq ` ı nÑ8ÝÝÝÑ 1, (62)
for any  ą 0. Hence the distortion constraints for legitimate users are satisfied.
Next we prove the secrecy constraint is also satisfied, i.e., if
lim sup
nÑ8
Rn ă min
 
RK `RS|ZpD0q, RSpD0q
(
, (63)
then lim
nÑ8ECZn
”
maxRnHcodes P
“
dEpSn, qSnq ď D0‰ı “ 0. To that end, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 8. [15] For a sequence of random variables tXnu, and a sequence of events tAnu, limnÑ8 P pAnq “ 0,
if and only if limnÑ8 P rP pAn|Xnq ą τns “ 0 for some sequence tτnu with τn ą 0 and limnÑ8 τn “ 0.
From Lemma 8, to prove the secrecy constraint we only need to show that if Rn satisfies (63), then
lim
nÑ8PCZn
”
max
RnHcodes
P
“
dEpSn, qSnq ď D0‰ ą τnı “ 0, (64)
for some sequence tτnu with τn ą 0 and limnÑ8 τn “ 0. Next we prove this.
Define event
A fi  `Sn, Z 1n˘ P T nδ `S,Z 1˘( , (65)
for δ ą 0. The δ-typical set is defined according to the notion of strong typicality, see [30]:
T nδ pSq fi tsn P Sn :
ÿ
sPS
|Tsn psq ´ PS psq| ď δu, (66)
where Tsn denotes the type (or empirical distribution) of sn. For simplicity, T nδ pSq is also shortly denoted as T nδ .
Since pSn, Z 1nq is an i.i.d. sequence, from the fact that the typical set has total probability close to one [30], we
have the following lemma.
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Lemma 9. [30] For any δ ą 0, P rAs Ñ 1, as nÑ8.
Consider that for each n, the optimal Rn-rate henchman code that maximizes P
“
dEpSn, qSnq ď D0|CZn‰ is
adopted, then we only need to show lim
nÑ8PCZn
”
P
“
dEpSn, qSnq ď D0|CZn‰ ą τnı “ 0 for these codes. By utilizing
Lemmas 8 and 9, we have
PCZn
”
P
“
dEpSn, qSnq ď D0|CZn‰ ą τnı
ďPCZn
”
P
“
dEpSn, qSnq ď D0|CZn‰ ą τn,P rAc|CZns ď nı` P rP rAc|CZns ą ns (67)
ďPCZn
”
P
“
dEpSn, qSnq ď D0,A|CZn‰` P rAc|CZns ą τn,P rAc|CZns ď nı` 1n (68)
ďPCZn
”
P
“
dEpSn, qSnq ď D0,A|CZn‰ ą τ 1nı` 1n, (69)
for some n and 1n that both vanish as n Ñ 8, where τ 1n “ τn ´ n. By choosing proper τn, τ 1n can be set to
some sequence that converges to zero sub-exponentially fast (i.e., τ 1n “ 2´opnq). Since n vanishes as nÑ8, this
guarantees that τn also vanishes as nÑ8.
Owing to the rate constraint, given pC, Znq, the reconstruction qSn cannot take more than Rn values. Denote the
set of possible values as cpC, Znq, then
P
“
dEpSn, qSnq ď D0,A|CZn‰ “ P” minqsnPcpC,Znq dEpSn, qsnq ď D0,A|CZnı. (70)
Now we apply a union bound to the right-hand side of (70) and write
P
”
minqsnPcpC,Znq dEpSn, qsnq ď D0,A|CZnı
ď
ÿ
qsnPcpC,ZnqP
”
dEpSn, qsnq ď D0,A|CZnı (71)
ď2nRn maxqsnPcpC,ZnqP
”
dEpSn, qsnq ď D0,A|CZnı (72)
ď2nRn maxqsnP qSn P
”
dEpSn, qsnq ď D0,A|CZnı (73)
“2nRn maxqsnP qSn
2nRKÿ
k“1
P rK “ k|CZnsP rdEpSn, qsnq ď D0,A|CZn,K “ ks (74)
“2npRn´RKq maxqsnP qSn
2nRKÿ
k“1
P rdEpSn, qsnq ď D0,A|Ψk, Zns , (75)
where (75) follows from the Markov chain CKZn Ñ ΨKZn Ñ SnZnA and P rK “ k|C “ c, Zn “ zns “ 2´nRK
(see (61)).
Combine (69), (70), and (75), then we have
PCZn
”
P
“
dEpSn, qSnq ď D0|CZn‰ ą τnı
ď PCZn
”
maxqsnP qSn
2nRKÿ
k“1
P rdEpSn, qsnq ď D0,A|Ψk, Zns ą τ 1n2´npRn´RKqı` 1n (76)
ď
ˇˇˇ qSn ˇˇˇ maxqsnP qSn PCZn
” 2nRKÿ
k“1
ξk,zn pqsnq ą τ 1n2´npRn´RKqı` 1n, (77)
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where
ξk,zn pqsnq fi P rdEpSn, qsnq ď D0,A|Ψk, Zns , (78)
Therefore, if we can show that the probability in (77) decays doubly exponentially fast with n, then the proof will
be complete.
Consider that given qsn and zn, ξk,zn pqsnq , k P “2nRK‰ are i.i.d. random variables, with mean
ECξk,zn pqsnq “ ECP rdEpSn, qsnq ď D0,A|Ψk, zns (79)
“ EΨkP rdEpSn, qsnq ď D0,A|Ψk, zns (80)
To complete the proof, we need introduce the following lemmas. The proof of Lemma 10 is given in Appendix B.
Lemma 10. Assume Sn is i.i.d. according to PS , then for any type t of sequences in Sn and any qsn,
PrdE pSn, qsnq ď D,Sn P T nδ |TSn “ ts ď 2´npRSpDq´op1qq, (81)
where TSn denotes the type of Sn, and op1q is a term that vanishes as δ Ñ 0 and nÑ8.
Lemma 11. [14] Fix PS|Z and zn. If Sn is distributed according to
śn
i“1 PS|Z“zi , then for any qsn,
PrdE pSn, qsnq ď D, pSn, znq P T nδ |zns ď 2´npRS|ZpDq´op1qq, (82)
where op1q is a term that vanishes as δ Ñ 0 and nÑ8.
Lemma 12. [14] If Xm is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables on the interval r0, as with ErXis “ p, then
P
” mÿ
i“1
Xi ą k
ı
ď
´e¨m¨p
k
¯k{a
. (83)
From (60), we have
P rSn “ sn|Ψk, zns “
ź
PS|Z
`
si|z1i
˘
. (84)
Hence Lemma 11 implies
ξk,zn pqsnq “ P “dEpSn, qsnq ď D0,A|z1n‰ (85)
ď 2´npRS|ZpD0q´op1qq. (86)
On the other hand,
ECξk,zn pqsnq ď EΨkPrdEpSn, qsnq ď D0, Sn P T nδ |Ψk, zns (87)
“
ÿ
s1n
PrS1n “ s1n|znsEΨkPrdEpSn, qsnq ď D0, Sn P T nδ |S1n “ s1n,Ψks (88)
“
ÿ
s1n
PrS1n “ s1n|znsPrdEpSn, qsnq ď D0, Sn P T nδ |S1n “ s1ns (89)
“
ÿ
s1n
PrS1n “ s1n|znsPrdEpSn, qsnq ď D0, Sn P T nδ |TSn “ Ts1ns (90)
ď 2´npRSpD0q´op1qq. (91)
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Using these bounds, we apply Lemma 12 to the probability in (77) by identifying
m “ 2nRK , (92)
a “ 2´npRS|ZpD0q´op1qq, (93)
p ď 2´npRSpD0q´op1qq, (94)
k “ τ 1n2´npRn´RKq. (95)
Then we have
P
” 2nRKÿ
k“1
ξk,zn pqsnq ą τ 1n2´npRn´RKqı ď 2´nα2nβ , (96)
where
α “ RSpD0q ´Rn ´ op1q
β “ RK `RS|ZpD0q ´Rn ´ op1q.
(97)
For small enough δ and large enough n, both α and β are positive and bounded away from zero, and (96) vanishes
doubly exponentially fast. Therefore, the expression in (77) vanishes. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 10
If
ř
sPS |t psq ´ PS psq| ą δ, then PrdE pSn, qsnq ď D,Sn P T nδ |TSn “ ts “ 0. Hence we only need to consider
the t’s such that
ř
sPS |t psq ´ PS psq| ď δ.
Consider
PrTSn “ ts “
ˇˇ 
s1n P Sn : Ts1n “ t
(ˇˇ
2´npDpt||PSq`Hptqq (98)
“ 2´npDpt||PSq`op1qq (99)
for any type t of sequences in Sn, where D pt||PSq denotes the relative entropy between t and PS , and (99) follows
from (15). Moreover, from [32, Thm. 25] we have
D pt||PSq ď log
˜
1` p
ř
s |t psq ´ PS psq|q2
2PS,min
¸
ď log
ˆ
1` δ
2
2PS,min
˙
Ñ 0, (100)
as δ Ñ 0, where PS,min “ minsPS PS psq. Therefore,
PrTSn “ ts ě 2´nop1q. (101)
Utilizing (101), we get
PrdE pSn, qsnq ď D,Sn P T nδ |TSn “ ts
“ PrdE pS
n, qsnq ď D,Sn P T nδ , TSn “ ts
PrTSn “ ts (102)
ď PrdE pS
n, qsnq ď D,Sn P T nδ s
2´nop1q
. (103)
To complete the proof, we need the following lemma.
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Lemma 13. [14] Assume Sn is i.i.d. according to PS , then for any qsn,
PrdE pSn, qsnq ď D,Sn P T nδ s ď 2´npRSpDq´op1qq. (104)
By the lemma above, (103) implies that
PrdE pSn, qsnq ď D,Sn P T nδ |TSn “ ts ď 2´npRSpDq´op1qq. (105)
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Define X 1n, Y 1ni , Z 1n same as (55)-(57), then the distribution PCSnKS1nXnY ni ZnX1nY 1ni Z1n pS1ni pSni also satisfies (60)
and (61). Similar to the finite alphabet case, it is easy to show the distortion constraints for legitimate users are
satisfied.
Next following similar steps to the proof for the finite alphabet case, we prove the secrecy constraint is also
satisfied for this case. Before proving that, we need introduce d´tilted information and conditional d´tilted
information first.
Let P qS‹|S be a distribution that achieves the rate-distortion function RSpDq (which is not necessarily unique).
Then d´tilted information is defined as follows.
Definition 6 (d´tilted information [15]). For D ą Dmin fi inf tD : RSpDq ă 8u, the d´tilted information in s
is defined as
Sps,Dq “ log 1
E
“
exp
`
λ‹D ´ λ‹dps, qS‹q˘‰ , (106)
where the expectation is with respect to P qS‹ , i.e. the unconditional distribution of the reproduction random variable
that achieves RSpDq, and
λ‹ “ ´R1SpDq. (107)
For pS,Zq that follow the distribution in (18), we define
RS|Z“zpβq “ min
P qS|S,Z“z :E
“
dEpS, qSq|Z“z‰ďβ IpS; qS|Z “ zq. (108)
Let P qS‹|S,Z“z be a distribution that achieves RS|Z“zpβq. Define b‹ pzq fi ES, qS‹|Z“zdpS, qS‹q with the expectation
taken with respect to PS|Z“zP qS‹|S,Z“z .
Definition 7 (Conditional d´tilted information [15]). For b‹ pzq ą βmin pzq fi inf
 
β : RS|Z“zpβq ă 8
(
, the
conditional d´tilted information in s under condition Z “ z is defined as
S|Z“zps, b‹ pzqq “ log 1
E qS‹|Z“z
”
exp
´
λ‹ pzq b‹ pzq ´ λ‹ pzq dps, qS‹q¯ı , (109)
where the expectation is with respect to P qS‹|Z“z , i.e. the margin distribution of PS|Z“zP qS‹|S,Z“z , and
λ‹ pzq “ ´R1S|Z“zpb‹ pzqq. (110)
Next we prove the secrecy constraint. To that end, we need re-define
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A fi
!
Sn P Unδ , 1n
nÿ
i“1
SpSi, D0q ě RSpD0q ´ δ,
1
n
nÿ
i“1
S|Z“Z1ipSi, b‹pZ 1iqq ě RS|ZpD0q ´ δ,
1
n
nÿ
i“1
b‹pZ 1iq ě D0 ´ δ
)
(111)
for δ ą 0. The δ-unified typical set is defined as16
Unδ pSq fi T nδ
logn
pSq XWnδ pSq, (112)
where T nδ
logn
pSq defined in (66), denotes the δlogn -strongly typical set, and
Wnδ pSq fi
!
sn P Sn :
ˇˇˇ
´ 1
n
logPSn psnq ´H pSq
ˇˇˇ
ď δ
)
, (113)
denotes the δ-weakly typical set [28]. For simplicity, Unδ pSq is also shortly denoted as Unδ .
Since pSn, Z 1nq is an i.i.d. sequence, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 14. [15, Lem. 18] [34, Lem. 2] Assume PS satisfies rNPS ´ δ1logn¯ “ o´ nlog2 n¯ ,@0 ă δ1 ď 1. Then for
any δ ą 0, P rAs Ñ 1 as nÑ8.
Then the derivation up to (77) still holds, i.e.,
PCZn
”
P
“
dEpSn, qSnq ď D0|CZn‰ ą τnı
ď
ˇˇˇ qSn ˇˇˇ maxqsnP qSn PCZn
” 2nRKÿ
k“1
ξk,zn pqsnq ą τ 1n2´npRn´RKqı` 1n, (114)
Therefore, if we can show that the probability in (114) decays doubly exponentially fast with n, then the proof
will be complete. To that end, we need introduce the following lemmas. The proof of Lemma 15 is given in
Appendix D.
Lemma 15. Assume PS satisfies NPS
`
1
n
˘ “ o´ nlogn¯ ,ΦPS ` 1n˘ “ o´ 1logn¯, and Sn is i.i.d. according to PS ,
then for any type t of sequences in Sn and any qsn P qSn,
P
“
dEpSn, qsnq ď D,Sn P Unδ , 1n
nÿ
i“1
SpSi, Dq ě RSpDq ´ δ|TSn “ t
‰ ď 2´npRSpDq´op1qq, (115)
where op1q is a term that vanishes as δ Ñ 0 and nÑ8.
Lemma 16. [15] Fix PSZ and zn P Zn. Assume given Zn “ zn, Sn is distributed according to śni“1 PS|Z“zi ,
then for any qsn P qSn,
P
”
dEpSn, qsnq ď D, 1
n
nÿ
i“1
S|Z“zipSi, b‹pziqq ě RS|ZpDq ´ δ,
1
n
nÿ
i“1
b‹pziq ě D ´ δ|Zn “ zn
ı
ď 2´npRS|ZpDq´op1qq, (116)
16Here the δ-unified typical set is different from the one defined in [34]. Our definition has the benefit that it makes the following property
hold: For each sequence sn P Unδ pSq,
ˇˇ 
s1n P Unδ pSq : Ts1n “ Tsn
(ˇˇ “ 2npHpSq´op1qq, or equivalently, PrTSn “ Tsn s “ 2´nop1q, where
op1q is a term that vanishes as δ Ñ 0 and nÑ8. This property coincides with (101) for the finite alphabet case, and it is of crucial importance
to our proof here (see (126)).
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where op1q is a term that vanishes as δ Ñ 0 and nÑ8.
Apply Lemmas 12, 15 and 16, then we have that the probability in (114) decays doubly exponentially fast with
n. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
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If
ř
sPS |t psq ´ PS psq| ď δlogn does not hold, then PrdE pSn, qsnq ď D,Sn P Unδ |TSn “ ts “ 0. Hence we only
need to consider the t’s satisfying
ř
sPS |t psq ´ PS psq| ď δlogn .
The Lemma 2.6 of [29] says that for any type t of sequences in Sn,
PrTSn “ ts ě pn` 1q´|suppptq| 2´nDpt||PSq, (117)
where supp ptq fi ts P S : t psq ą 0u denotes the suppose of t.
Now we prove that for any δ ą 0, |supp ptq| ď nlogn pδ ` nq holds, where n is a term that vanishes as nÑ8.
To that end, we divide S into two parts:  s : PS psq ě 1n( and  s : PS psq ă 1n(. Then
|supp ptq| “
ˇˇˇˇ"
s : t psq ą 0, PS psq ě 1
n
*ˇˇˇˇ
`
ˇˇˇˇ"
s : t psq ą 0, PS psq ă 1
n
*ˇˇˇˇ
(118)
ď
ˇˇˇˇ"
s : PS psq ě 1
n
*ˇˇˇˇ
`
ˇˇˇˇ"
s : t psq ą 0, PS psq ă 1
n
*ˇˇˇˇ
(119)
“ NPS
ˆ
1
n
˙
`
ÿ
s:PSpsqă 1n
1 tt psq ą 0u (120)
ď NPS
ˆ
1
n
˙
` n
ÿ
s:PSpsqă 1n
t psq , (121)
where (120) follows from the definition of NPS
`
1
n
˘
, and (121) follows from the fact t psq ě 1n for any s such that
t psq ą 0.
Since
ř
sPS |t psq ´ PS psq| ě
ř
s:PSpsqă 1n |t psq ´ PS psq| ě
ř
s:PSpsqă 1n pt psq ´ PS psqq and
ř
sPS |t psq ´ PS psq| ď
δ
logn , we have ÿ
s:PSpsqă 1n
t psq ď
ÿ
s:PSpsqă 1n
PS psq ` δ
log n
(122)
“ ΦPS
ˆ
1
n
˙
` δ
log n
. (123)
Therefore,
|supp ptq| ď NPS
ˆ
1
n
˙
` nΦPS
ˆ
1
n
˙
` δn
log n
. (124)
Since NPS
`
1
n
˘ “ o´ nlogn¯ ,ΦPS ` 1n˘ “ o´ 1logn¯, we have |supp ptq| ď nlogn pδ ` nq. Therefore, (117) implies
PrTSn “ ts ě 2´npDpt||PSq`δ`nq. (125)
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Furthermore, Sn P Unδ implies D pt||PSq ď 2δ, which is obtained by following part of proof steps of [34, Thm. 3]
(but with and δ replaced with δ and nlogn , respectively). Hence it holds that
PrTSn “ ts ě 2´nop1q, (126)
where op1q is a term that vanishes as δ Ñ 0 and nÑ8. Utilizing (126), we can get
PrdE pSn, qsnq ď D,Sn P Unδ , 1n
nÿ
i“1
SpSi, Dq ě RSpDq ´ δ|TSn “ ts
“ PrdE pS
n, qsnq ď D,Sn P Unδ , 1n řni“1 SpSi, Dq ě RSpDq ´ δ, TSn “ ts
PrTSn “ ts (127)
ď PrdE pS
n, qsnq ď D, 1n řni“1 SpSi, Dq ě RSpDq ´ δs
2´nop1q
. (128)
To complete the proof, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 17. [15] Assume S and qS are general (not necessarily countable) alphabets, and Sn is i.i.d. drawn from
Sn according to PS . Then for any D ą Dmin (Dmin is defined in Definition 6) and any qsn P qSn,
PrdE pSn, qsnq ď D, 1
n
nÿ
i“1
SpSi, Dq ě RSpDq ´ δs ď 2´npRSpDq´op1qq. (129)
Hence by the lemma above, (128) implies that
PrdE pSn, qsnq ď D,Sn P Unδ , 1n
nÿ
i“1
SpSi, Dq ě RSpDq ´ δ|TSn “ ts ď 2´npRSpDq´op1qq. (130)
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Similar to the DM cases, it is easy to show the distortion constraints for legitimate users are satisfied.
Next by following similar steps to the proof for the DM cases, we prove the secrecy constraint is also satisfied.
To that end, we first need to discretize the source S and the reconstruction qS. Let
rSs, rqSs P N fi t¨ ¨ ¨ ,´2∆,´∆, 0,∆, 2∆, ¨ ¨ ¨ u , (131)
be quantized versions of S and qS, obtained by mapping S and qS to the closest quantization point, i.e., rSs “
∆ ¨ Round ` S∆˘ , rqSs “ ∆ ¨ Round´ qS∆¯. Then we have for any sn P Rn,
0 ď 1
n
nÿ
i“1
psi ´ rsisq2 ď ∆
2
4
. (132)
Furthermore, it holds thata
ndpsn, qsnq “ ||sn ´ rqssn ` rqssn ´ qsn|| (133)
ě ||sn ´ rqssn || ´ || rqssn ´ qsn|| (134)
ě || rssn ´ rqssn || ´ ||sn ´ rssn || ´ || rqssn ´ qsn|| (135)
ě
b
ndprssn , rqssnq ´∆ (136)
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where (134) follows from triangle inequality. Utilizing this inequality, we have
P rdpSn, qsnq ď D0,A|Ψk, Zns ď P „d prSsn, rqssnq ď ´aD0 `∆¯2 ,A|Ψk, Zn (137)
“ P “d prSsn, rqssnq ď D10,A|Ψk, Zn‰ , (138)
where D10 fi
`?
D0 `∆
˘2
.
Reorder the probabilities PrSsprssq, rss P N in decreasing order, and denote the result as Pi, i “ 1, 2, .... Then
P1 “ PrSsp0q, P2j “ P2j`1 “ PrSspj∆q, j ě 1. Obviously,
∆fS ppj ` 1q∆q ď P2j “ P2j`1 ď ∆fS pj∆q , (139)
and hence for Gaussian sources, P2j “ P2j`1 “ ope´j2q. From Remark 2, we have that PrSs satisfies the conditions
(23)-(25).
Define event
A fi
!
Sn PWnδ , rSsn P Unδ prSsq, 1n
nÿ
i“1
SprSsi, D0q ě RrSspD0q ´ δ,
1
n
nÿ
i“1
rSs|Z“Z1iprSsi, b‹pZ 1iqq ě RrSs|ZpD0q ´ δ,
1
n
nÿ
i“1
b‹pZ 1iq ě D0 ´ δ
)
(140)
for δ ą 0. Observe that the distribution PCSnKS1nXnY ni ZnX1nY 1ni Z1n pS1ni pSni also satisfies (60) and (61), which implies
pSn, Z 1nq is an i.i.d. sequence. Hence Lemma 14 still holds for this case. Following similar steps to the proof of
Theorem 1, we can get
PCZn
”
P
“
dEpSn, qSnq ď D0|CZn‰ ą τnı
ď PCZn
”
max
rqssnPNn
2nRKÿ
k“1
P
“
dprSsn, rqssnq ď D10,A|Ψk, Zn‰ ą τ 1n2´npRn´RKqı` 1n (141)
“ PCZn
”
max
rqssnPBn
2nRKÿ
k“1
P
“
dprSsn, rqssnq ď D10,A|Ψk, Zn‰ ą τ 1n2´npRn´RKqı` 1n (142)
ď |Bn| max
rqssnPBn PCZn
” 2nRKÿ
k“1
ξk,zn prqssnq ą τ 1n2´npRn´RKqı` 1n, (143)
where
Bn fi
!
rqssn P Nn : }rqssn} ď ?nΓ) (144)
with
?
Γ fi
a
λ p1` δq ` ?∆`aD10,
ξk,zn prqssnq fi P “d prSsn, rqssnq ď D10,A|Ψk, Zn‰ , (145)
and (142) follows that Sn only appears in the ball with radius
a
nλ p1` δq which implies rSsn only appears in
the ball with radius
a
λ p1` δq ` ?∆ , hence it is sufficient to only consider rqssn P Bn instead of the whole set
Nn.
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Furthermore, observe that
|Bn| ď Volume of n´ball with radius
?
nΓ`?n∆2
∆n
(146)
“
pin{2
´?
nΓ`?n∆2
¯n
∆nΓ
`
n
2 ` 1
˘ (147)
ď 2n2 log pi`n logp
?
nΓ`?n∆2q´n log ∆´n2 log n2e´ 12 log pin`op1q (148)
“ 2n2 log
2piep?Γ`?∆2q2
∆2
´ 12 log pin`op1q. (149)
Therefore, if we can show that the probability in (143) decays doubly exponentially fast with n, then the proof
will be complete.
Apply Lemmas 12, 15 and 16, then we have the probability in (143) decays doubly exponentially fast with m.
Hence lim
nÑ8ECZn
”
maxRnHcodes P
“
dEpSn, qSnq ď D0‰ı “ 0 if
lim sup
nÑ8
Rn ă min
 
RK `RrSs|ZpD10q, RrSspD10q
(
. (150)
To complete the proof, we need to show RrSs|ZpD10q ě RS|ZpD0q and RrSspD10q ě RSpD0q as ∆ Ñ 0.
Suppose Pr qSs˚|rSsZ achieves RrSs|ZpD10q, then RrSs|ZpD10q “ IprSs; rqSs˚|Zq and EdprSs, rqSs˚q ď D10. Since for
PrSsr qSs˚|SZ “ PrSs|SPr qSs˚|rSsZ ,
EdpS, rqSs˚q “ E´S ´ rSs ` rSs ´ rqSs˚¯2 (151)
“ E
´
rSs ´ rqSs˚¯2 ` E pS ´ rSsq2 ` 2E pS ´ rSsq´rSs ´ rqSs˚¯ (152)
ď EdprSs, rqSs˚q `∆bEdprSs, rqSs˚q (153)
ď D10 `∆
a
D10, (154)
where (153) follows from the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality. On the other hand, RS|Z
`
D10 `∆
a
D10
˘
is defined
as the minimum IpS; qS|Zq such that EdpS, qSq ď D10 ` ∆aD10. Hence RS|Z `D10 `∆aD10˘ ď IpS; rqSs˚|Zq “
IprSs; rqSs˚|Zq “ RrSs|ZpD10q. Let ∆ Ñ 0, then we have RS|ZpD0q ď lim∆Ñ0RrSs|ZpD10q. Similarly, we can
prove RSpD0q ď lim∆Ñ0RrSspD10q. This completes the proof of Theorem 5.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
Denote X 1n, Y 1ni , Z 1n as (55)-(57), where ΨK p¨q denotes the orthogonal transform, instead of the permutation op-
eration. Then it can be verified that for Gaussian source-channel pair, the distribution PCSnKS1nXnY ni ZnX1nY 1ni Z1n pS1ni pSni
also satisfies (60) and (61). Hence pΨK , Znq Ñ Z 1n Ñ Sn forms a Markov chain.
Similar to the permutation-based scheme, it is easy to show the power constraint and the distortion constraints
for legitimate users are satisfied. Next by following similar steps to the proof for the permutation-based scheme, we
prove the secrecy constraint is also satisfied. But a slight difference is that here we use an argument from a geometric
point of view, instead of the one from the view of rate-distortion theory (or method of types) used for Theorems
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1, 2, and 5. Here we do not need to discretize the source. But we still need to discretize the reconstruction qS as
(131), since it will enable us to take the maximizing operation out of the probability, just as done in (141)-(143).
Define event
A fi  `Sn, Z 1n˘ PWnδ pS,Zq( , (155)
for δ ą 0. For jointly Gaussian variables X and Z, where Z “ X ` U and U is independent of X , the δ-weakly
typical set and the δ-weakly jointly typical set become
Wnδ pXq fi
!
xn P Xn :
ˇˇˇ}xn}2
nNX
´ 1
ˇˇˇ
ď δ
)
, (156)
and
Wnδ pX,Zq fi
!
pxn, znq P R2n :
ˇˇˇ}xn}2
nNX
´ 1
ˇˇˇ
ď δ, (157)ˇˇˇ}zn}2
nNZ
´ 1
ˇˇˇ
ď δ, (158)ˇˇˇ}xn}2
nNX
` }z
n ´ xn}2
nNU
´ 2
ˇˇˇ
ď δ
)
, (159)
respectively, where NZ , NX and NU denote the variances of Z, X and U , respectively.
Since pSn, Z 1nq is an i.i.d. sequence, from the fact that (weakly) typical set has total probability close to one
[28], we have the following lemma.
Lemma 18. [28] For any δ ą 0, P rAcs Ñ 0, as nÑ8.
Following similar steps to the proof of Theorem 5, we can get
PCZn
”
P
“
dpSn, qSnq ď D0|CZn‰ ą τnı
ď |Bn| max
rqssnPBn PCZn
” 2nRKÿ
k“1
ξk,zn prqssnq ą τ 1n2´npRn´RKqı` 1n, (160)
where Bn is given by (144), and
ξk,zn prqssnq fi P “d pSn, rqssnq ď D10,A|Ψk, Zn‰ . (161)
Since as shown in (149), |Bn| is upper bounded by an exponential function, we only need to show that the
probability in (160) decays doubly exponentially fast with n. To that end, we need introduce the following lemmas.
The proofs of Lemmas 20 and 19 are given in Appendixes G and H, respectively.
Lemma 19. Assume Sn “ Zn`Un, where Zn „ N p0, NZIq and Un „ N p0, NUIq17 are independent, then for
any zn, s¯n P Rn,
Prd pSn, s¯nq ď D, pSn, znq PWnδ |zns ď 2´npRS|ZpDq´op1qq, (162)
where RS|ZpDq “ 12 log`
`
NU
D
˘
, and op1q is a term that vanishes as δ Ñ 0 and nÑ8.
17Here 0 denotes an all-zero vector and I denotes an identity matrix
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Lemma 20. Assume Sn „ N p0, NSIq and S1n “ ΨSn, with Ψ uniformly distributed on orthogonal matrices set
and independent of Sn, then for any s1n, s¯n P Rn,
Prd pSn, s¯nq ď D,Sn PWnδ |s1ns ď 2´npRSpDq´op1qq, (163)
where RSpDq “ 12 log`
`
NS
D
˘
, and op1q is a term that vanishes as δ Ñ 0 and nÑ8.
Then we have
ECξk,zn prqssnq ď EΨkPrd pSn, rqssnq ď D10, Sn PWnδ |Ψk, zns (164)
“ EΨk
ż
Prd pSn, rqssnq ď D10, Sn PWnδ |Ψk, zn, s1nsfS1n|Zn `s1n|Ψk, zn˘ ds1n (165)
“
ż
PΨk rd pSn, rqssnq ď D10, Sn PWnδ |s1nsfS1n|Zn `s1n|zn˘ ds1n (166)
ď 2´npRSpD10q´op1qq, (167)
where (167) follows from Lemma 20. Furthermore, Lemma 19 implies
ξk,zn prqssnq “ P “d pSn, rqssnq ď D10,A|z1n‰ (168)
ď 2´npRS|ZpD10q´op1qq, (169)
where (167) follows from ΨKZn Ñ Z 1n Ñ Sn.
Applying Lemmas 12, we have that the probability in (160) decays doubly exponentially fast with n. This
completes the proof of Theorem 6.
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Consider that
Prd pSn, s¯nq ď D, pSn, znq PWnδ |zns
ď Prd pSn, s¯nq ď D, }z
n}2
nNZ
P 1˘ δ, }z
n}2
nNZ
` }S
n ´ zn}2
nNU
P 2˘ δ|zns (170)
ď Prd pSn, s¯nq ď D, }S
n ´ zn}2
nNU
P 1˘ 2δ|zns. (171)
Denote R “ 1n }Sn ´ zn}2, then
Prd pSn, s¯nq ď D, pSn, znq PWnδ |zns
ď
ż NU p1`2δq
NU p1´2δq
fR|Zn pr|znqPrd pSn, s¯nq ď D|R “ r, Zn “ znsdr. (172)
Given Zn “ zn, Sn ´ zn „ N p0, NUIq, and on the other hand, Gaussian distribution is isotropic (or invariant
to rotation). Hence under condition of Zn “ zn and R “ r, Sn is uniformly distributed over the sphere with center
zn and radius
?
nr.
Prd pSn, s¯nq ď D|R “ r, Zn “ zns ď Ω pθq
Ω ppiq , (173)
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 sin
1
O
Fig. 6. Cap cut out by the cone on the unit sphere.
where
θ “ arcsin
c
D
r
, (174)
and Ω pθq be solid angle in n space of a cone with half-angle θ, i.e., the area of a spherical cap on a unit sphere
(see Fig. 6). To approximate ΩpθqΩppiq , we need the following lemma.
Lemma 21. [33] Let Ω pθq be solid angle in n space of a cone with half-angle θ, then it holds that
Ω pθq
Ω ppiq “
sinn´1 θ?
2pin cos θ
ˆ
1`O
ˆ
1
n
˙˙
. (175)
Lemma 21 implies
Ω pθq
Ω ppiq “ 2
nplog sin θ´ 1n logp?2pin sin θ cos θq` 1n logp1`Op 1n qqq (176)
“ 2nplog sin θ`op1qq. (177)
Combine (173), (174) and (177), then we have for any r P NU p1˘ 2δq,
Prd pSn, s¯nq ď D|R “ r, Zn “ zns ď 2n
´
log
?
D
r `op1q
¯
(178)
ď 2n
´
log
b
D
NU p1´2δq`op1q
¯
(179)
“ 2´n
´
1
2 log
NU
D ´op1q
¯
, (180)
where op1q is a term that vanishes as δ Ñ 0 and n Ñ 8. Combining (172) and (180) gives us Prd pSn, s¯nq ď
D, pSn, znq PWnδ |zns ď 2´n
´
1
2 log
NU
D ´op1q
¯
. This completes the proof of Lemma 19.
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Observe that
Prd pSn, s¯nq ď D,Sn PWnδ |s1ns
“ Prd pSn, s¯nq ď D, }S
n}2
nNS
P 1˘ δ|s1ns (181)
“ PΨrd
`
ΨT s1n, s¯n
˘ ď D|s1ns1#}s1n}2
nNS
P 1˘ δ
+
. (182)
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Since Ψ is uniformly distributed on orthogonal matrices set (so is ΨT as stated in Lemma (4)), Lemma 5 implies
that for any s1n, ΨT s1n is uniformly distributed over the sphere with center at the origin O and radius }s1n}. Hence
PΨrd
`
ΨT s1n, s¯n
˘ ď D|s1ns ď Ω pθq
Ω ppiq , (183)
where as described in the previous section, Ω pθq denotes solid angle in n space of a cone with half-angle θ, and
θ “ arcsin
d
D
1
n }s1n}2
. (184)
From Lemma 21, we have for any s1n such that }s1n}
2
nNS
P 1˘ δ,
PΨrd
`
ΨT s1n, s¯n
˘ ď D|s1ns ď 2n
˜
log
c
D
1
n }s1n}2
`op1q
¸
(185)
ď 2n
´
log
b
D
NSp1´δq`op1q
¯
(186)
ď 2´n
´
1
2 log
NS
D `op1q
¯
, (187)
where op1q is a term that vanishes as δ Ñ 0 and nÑ8. Combining (182) and (187) gives us
Prd pSn, s¯nq ď D,Sn PWnδ |s1ns ď 2´n
´
1
2 log
NS
D `op1q
¯
. (188)
This completes the proof of Lemma 20.
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PROOF OF LEMMA 6
By choosing qS to be independent of Z, we have RS|ZpD0q “ min
P qS|SZ :EdpS, qSqďD0 IpS;
qS|Zq ď min
P qS|S :EdpS, qSqďD0 IpS;
qSq “
RSpD0q “ 12 log`
´
λ
D0
¯
. Then we only need to prove RS|ZpD0q ď RpUBqS|Z pD0q.
First consider the case of λN0P 1`N0 ď D0 ď λ. Assume
Q “
$’&’%1, with probability p;0, with probability 1´ p, (189)
independent of pS,Zq, denotes a timesharing random variable, and also assume
qSQ “
$’&’%β0ΨKZ, if Q “ 1;0, if Q “ 0, (190)
where β0 “
?
λP 1
P 1`N0 and ΨK is defined in (36). Then
EdpS, qSQq “ EQE ”dpS, qSQq|Qı (191)
“ p λN0
P 1 `N0 ` p1´ pqλ. (192)
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Therefore, to satisfy distortion constraint EdpS, qSQq ď D0, it is sufficient to set p “ pλ´D0qpP 1`N0qλP 1 . SubstitutingqSQ into RS|ZpD0q, we have
RS|ZpD0q ď IpS; qSQ|Zq (193)
ď IpS; qSQQ|Zq (194)
“ IpS; qSQ|QZq (195)
“ pIpS; qSQ|Z,Q “ 1q ` p1´ pq IpS; qSQ|Z,Q “ 0q (196)
“ pIpS; qSQ|Z,Q “ 1q (197)
ď pIpS;K|Z,Q “ 1q (198)
ď pHpKq (199)
“ p (200)
“ pλ´D0q pP
1 `N0q
λP 1
, (201)
where (195) follows from Q is independent of pS,Zq.
Next consider the case of 0 ď D0 ď λN0P 1`N0 . Observe that
RS|ZpD0q “ min
P qS|SZ :EdpS, qSqďD0 IpS;
qS|Zq (202)
“ min
P qS|SZK :EdpS, qSqďD0 IpS;
qS|Zq (203)
ď min
P qS|SZK :EdpS, qSqďD0 IpS;
qSK|Zq (204)
“ IpS;K|Zq ` min
P qS|SZK :EdpS, qSqďD0 IpS;
qS|ZKq (205)
ď HpKq ` min
P qS|SZK :EdpS, qSqďD0 IpS;
qS|ZKq, (206)
where (203) follows since, on one hand, by setting P qS|SZK in (203) as P qS|SZ we have (202)ě(203); on the other
hand, given PSZK , both the constraint and the optimization objective only depend on P qS|SZ “ řk P qS|SZKPK|SZ ,
hence it suffices to optimize (203) over P qS|SZ .
The first term of (206) satisfies
HpKq “ 1. (207)
By (38) and (39), we have S and ΨKZ are jointly Gaussian, i.e.,
S “ β0ΨKZ ` V 10 (208)
where β0 “
?
λP 1
P 1`N0 , ΨK is defined in (36), and V
1
0 „ N
´
0, λN0P 1`N0
¯
is independent of ΨKZ. Hence we can also
write qS˚ “ β0ΨKZ ` V 20 (209)
38
and
S “ qS˚ `∆V 20 , (210)
where V 20 „ N
´
0, λN0P 1`N0 ´D0
¯
and ∆V 20 „ N p0, D0q are independent of each other and also independent of
ΨKZ. Therefore, we can bound the second term in (206) as
min
P qS|SZK :EdpS, qSqďD0 IpS;
qS|ZKq ď IpS; qS˚|ZKq (211)
“ hpS|ZKq ´ hpS|ZK qS˚q (212)
“ hpS|Kq ` hpZ|SKq ´ hpZ|Kq ´ hpS ´ qS˚|ZK qS˚q (213)
ď 1
2
log 2pieλ` 1
2
log 2pieN0 ´ 1
2
log 2piepP 1 `N0q ´ hpS ´ qS˚q (214)
ď 1
2
log
ˆ
λN0
D0 pP 1 `N0q
˙
, (215)
where (211) follows since P qS˚|SZK satisfies the constraint EdpS, qS˚q ď D0, and (214) follows since ΨKZ ÑqS˚ Ñ S forms a Markov chain and S ´ qS˚ is independent of qS˚.
Combining (206), (207) and (215) gives us RS|ZpD0q ď RpUBqS|Z pD0q. This completes the proof of Lemma 6.
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Following similar steps to the proof for the scalar Gaussian case, it is easy to prove Rpiq is achievable by the
permutation based scheme. However, for the orthogonal-transform based scheme, the proof for the scalar Gaussian
case cannot be applied to the vector Gaussian case directly, and some details need to be treated specially. Next we
give a proof for this case.
Following similar steps to the proof of Theorem 6, it can be shown that for vector Gaussian case, the distortion
constraints and power constraint are satisfied for the tuples given in Theorem 11. Next we prove the secrecy
constraint is also satisfied.
Define events
Aj fi
 `
Snj , Z
1n
j
˘ PWnδ pSj , Zjq( , (216)
A fi
ź
jPrms
Aj , (217)
for δ ą 0. Similar to Lemma 18, it can be shown that for any δ ą 0, P “Acj‰Ñ 0, as nÑ8.
The derivation up to (160) still holds for vector Gaussian case. Hence
PCZn
”
max
RnHcodes
P
“
dpSn, qSnq ď D0|CZn‰ ą τnı
ď PCZn
”
maxqsnPRmn
2nRKÿ
k“1
P
“
dpSn, rqssnq ď D10,A|Ψj,k, j P rms,Zn‰ ą τ 1n2´npRn´RKqı
ff
` 1n, (218)
where D10 fi
`?
D0 `m∆
˘2
.
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Observe that P rdpSn, rqssnq ď D0,A|Ψj,k, j P rms,Zns “ şřm
j“1 dpsnj ,rqsjsnqďD10,A
śm
j“1 f
`
snj |Ψj,k, znj
˘
dsnj . One
may expect to exchange
ş
with
ś
, in order to write the expression as
śm
j“1 P
“
dpSnj , rqsjsnq ď dj ,Aj |Ψj,k, Znj ‰
for some dj , j P rms such that řmj“1 dj ď D10. However, obviously this is not feasible. To address this problem, we
need to discretize the source, and then eliminate the
ş
operation since after discretization it becomes a
ř
operation
with the number of summands polynomial in n.
Discretize S by rSs “ ∆ ¨ Round ` S∆˘. Then we have
P
“
dpSn, rqssnq ď D10,A|Ψj,k, j P rms,Zn‰
ď P “d prSsn , rqssnq ď D20 ,A|Ψj,k, j P rms,Zn‰ , (219)
where D20 fi
`a
D10 `m∆
˘2
. In addition, observe that
P
“
d prSsn , rqssnq ď D10,A|Ψj,k, j P rms,Zn‰
“ P
” mÿ
j“1
dprSjsn , rqsjsnq ď D10,A|Ψj,k, j P rms,Znı (220)
“
ÿ
dPDmn
mź
j“1
P
“
dprSjsn , rqsjsnq “ dj ,Aj |Ψj,k, Znj ‰ (221)
ď
ÿ
dPDmn
mź
j“1
P
“
dpSnj , rqsjsnq ď d1j ,Aj |Ψj,k, Znj ‰ , (222)
where d1j fi
`a
dj `∆
˘2
, and
Dmn fi  dprssn , rqssnq : rssn , rqssn P Bmn, d prssn , rqssnq ď D10(
Bmn fi
!
rqssn P Nmn : }rqsjsn} ďanΓj , 1 ď j ď m)
with
a
Γj fi
a
λj p1` δq`∆`
a
mD10. (221) follows from that Aj implies }rSjsn} ď
a
nλj p1` δq`∆, hence
it is sufficient to only consider the case of }rqsjsn} ďanΓj . (222) is obtained by using triangle inequality again.
Combining (218), (219) and (222) gives us
PCZn
”
max
RnHcodes
P
“
dpSn, qSnq ď D0|CZn‰ ą τnı
ď |Bmn| max
rqssnPBmn PCZn
” 2nRKÿ
k“1
ξk,zn prqssnq ą τ 1n2´npRn´RKqı` 1n, (223)
where
ξk,zn prqssnq fi ÿ
dPDmn
mź
j“1
P
“
dpSnj , rqsjsnq ď d1j ,Aj |Ψj,k, Znj ‰ . (224)
Given rqssn and zn, ξk,zn prqssnq , k P “2nRK‰ are i.i.d. with mean
ECξk,zn prqssnq “ EC ÿ
dPDmn
mź
j“1
P
“
dpSnj , rqsjsnq ď d1j ,Aj |Ψj,k, Znj ‰ (225)
“
ÿ
dPDmn
mź
j“1
EΨj,kP
“
dpSnj , rqsjsnq ď d1j ,Aj |Ψj,k, Znj ‰ . (226)
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To bound (223), we need to bound |Bmn| and |Dmn| first. Similar to (149), it can be shown
|Bmn| ď 2n2
řm
j“1 log
2piep?Γj`?∆2q2
∆2
`Oplognq. (227)
In addition, for rsjsn , rqsjsn such that }rsjsn} ďanΓj , }rqsjsn} ďanΓj , using triangle inequality we have
dprsjsn , rqsjsnq “ }rsjsn ´ rqsjsn}2 ď 4nΓj . (228)
Combine it with
dprsjsn , rqsjsnq “ 1
n
nÿ
i“1
prsi,js ´ rqsi,jsq2 “ ∆2
n
nÿ
i“1
´
li,j ´ qli,j¯2 , (229)
where li,j fi Round
` si,j
∆
˘
and qli,j fi Round´ qsi,j∆ ¯ are both integers, then we have
nÿ
i“1
´
li,j ´ qli,j¯2 ď 4n2Γj
∆2
. (230)
In addition,
řn
i“1
´
li,j ´ qli,j¯2 P NY t0u, hence
|Dmn| ď
mź
j“1
ˆ
4n2Γj
∆2
` 1
˙
. (231)
That is, |Dmn| is bounded by a polynomial term of n.
If we can show that the probability in (223) decays doubly exponentially fast with n, then the proof will be
complete. To that end, by using Lemma 19 we have
ξk,zn prqssnq ď |Dmn| 2´npřmj“1 RSj |Zj pd1jq´op1qq (232)
“ 2´np
řm
j“1 RSj |Zj pd1jq´op1qq (233)
ď 2´nmpRS|ZpD0`∆q´op1qq, (234)
where RS|ZpDq given in (52) denotes the conditional rate-distortion function for source S with side information
Z at both encoder and decoder, op1q is a term that vanishes as δ Ñ 0 and nÑ8, and ∆ is a term that vanishes
as ∆ Ñ 0. (233) follows from that |Dmn| grows only polynomially fast with n.
From Lemma 20, we have for any zn,
ECξk,zn prqssnq ď 2´nmpRSpD0`∆q´op1qq, (235)
where RSpDq given in (51) denotes the point-to-point rate-distortion function for S.
Using these bounds and applying Lemmas 12, we have that the probability in (223) decays doubly exponentially
fast with n. This completes the proof of Theorem 11.
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